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Foreword
This Faculty Contribution is ample evidence of the universal truth,
"a prophet is without honor in his own home." Dr. Robert R. Russel
is recognized among the world of historians as a scholar with vast
personal integrity and holds the admiring recognition of his peers. His
various studies of the ante bellum period have almost the stature of
primary data. As is true with all men of such stature, the true worth
is never completely recognized in the immediate environment. Only to
those who view the man from a more distant vantage point, is the
true caliber known.
It is with sincere pleasure that the School of Graduate Studies of
Western Michigan University reprints, with permission, six of Dr.
Russel's milestone studies of the ante bellum period under the title,
Ante Bellum Studies in Slavery, Politics, and the Railroads. The
quality of the publication is a signal criterion of the regard in which
he is held.
The School of Graduate Studies extends to Dr. Russel the most
sincere appreciation for the contributions he has made to Western
Michigan University, and dedicates this publication to him as a
merited tribute.
George G. Mallinson, Dean
School of Graduate Studies
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Introduction
Robert R. Russel joined the staff of the History Department of
Western Michigan University in 1922. Now, on the occasion of his
retirement after thirty-eight years of service, his colleagues in the de
partment he has administered so well for the past four years and the
School of Graduate Studies present this collection of six of his essays.
They deal with certain aspects of the Old South that have long
intrigued him.
Dr. Russel attended the graduate schools of the University of Kansas
and the University of Illinois, after earning his A.B. degree at Mc
Pherson College, in Kansas. At the University of Kansas he had the
good fortune to work under Professor Frank Hodder, who, in lieu of a
course in historical method, advised him to "jump into the middle of
a problem and work in all directions." This rough-and-ready procedure
would undoubtedly produce some type of result. But, without the
direction of a precise, persistent, and judicial mind, these scholarly
studies would not have emerged.
These studies are but a sample of Dr. Russel's scholarly production,
as the bibliography on page 98 indicates. They do, however, illustrate
well the characteristics of his work, namely, the refusal to be satisfied
with convenient generalizations, the concern for the precise phrase, the
reliance on primary materials, the effort for clear, sharp presentation.
They have been reprinted by permission of the journal officers as they
were published originally, without an attempt to reconcile differences
in editorial styles. Since they speak so well for themselves, there is
no interpretive comment. They are presented as a token of the
affectionate respect in which Robert Russel is held by those who know
him well-his colleagues at Western Michigan University.
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What Was the Compromise of 1850?
( Received the first Charles W. Ramsdall Award, 195 7)

By

T

ROBERT R. RUSSEL

Reprinted from The Journal of Southern History,
XXII (August 1956), 292-309.

HIS PAPER IS concerned only with those provisions of the Com
promise of 1850 which related to slavery in the territories, that is,
the slavery provisions of the acts organizing the territories of New
Mexico and Utah. Nothing is ventured here about the admission of
California as a state, the fixing of the Texas-New Mexico boundary,
the Fugitive Slave Law, or the law on slave trading in the District
of Columbia. The slavery provisions of the territorial acts are the ones
most frequently misunderstood. They were the hardest to frame and,
with the possible exception of the Texas boundary, the hardest to
reach agreement upon in Congress. They are the part most necessary
to understand if one is to follow intelligently later phases of the
sectional struggle over slavery. They represented, it is believed, the
heart of the compromise.
Books treating the compromise do not agree or even approximately
agree as to what were the actual provisions of the New Mexico and
Utah acts relating to slavery. They agree still less as to wherein those
provisions represented compromise, that is, as to who conceded what.
They do not even agree in their definition of the much used term
"squatter sovereignty." Take a brief look at the college textbooks; we
are entitled to expect to find in them the closest approach to accuracy.
Four college textbooks blandly state that New Mexico and Utah
territories were organized "without mention" of slavery or "without
provisions" regarding slavery.! A fifth textbook states that the

I Leland D. Baldwin, The Stre{JJrrl of American History (2 vols., New York,
1952), I, 724; Asa E. Martin, History of the United States (2 vols., rev. ed.,
Boston, 1946), I, 715; Avery Craven and Walter Johnson, The United States:
Experiment in Democracy (Boston, 1947), 358, 360; Robert E. Riegel and
David F. Long, The American Story (2 vols., New York, 1955), I, 302.
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territories were organized "with no prov1S1on for slavery during the
territorial period" but adds that the states which might be made
from the territories were to be admitted with or without slavery as
their constitutions might prescribe at the time of their admission. 2
Six other textbooks tell of the organization of the two territories with
out mentioning any other provision as to slavery than the statehood
provision and, so, imply that there was no other. 3 Three of the six
say that the territories were organized "without the Wilmot Proviso"
and then give the statehood provision; they do not explain what
the status of slavery would be in a territory organized "without the
Wilmot Proviso."4 Six other college textbooks state that the territorial
acts provided the "popular sovereignty" or "squatter sovereignty" as
to slavery during the territorial period. They mention no other
slavery provision and, so, imply that there was no other.5 These six
give three substantially different definitions of popular sovereignty.
Five additional textbooks, in addition to stating one, or the other,
or both of the provisions heretofore mentioned, state a third slavery
provision of the territorial acts, namely, one for the submission of
the question of the status of slavery in the territories to the Supreme
Court of the United States.6 No two of the five in this class agree
very closely, though, as to how, and when, and in what form the
question might be submitted to the Supreme Court or what the
2 Oliver P. Chitwood, Frank L. Owsley, and H. C. Nixon, A Short History
of the American People (2 vols., New York, 1945-1952), I, 6 3 8- 3 9.
3 Arthur C. Bining and Philip S. Klein, A History of the United States (2
vols., New York, 1950-1951), I, 540; Harry J. Carman and Harold C. Syrett,
A History of the American People (2 vols., New York, 195 2 ), I, 571-73 ; Sam
uel E. Morison and Henry S. Commager, The Growth of the American Re
public (2 vols., 4th ed., New York, 1950), I, 604, 606; James G. Randall, The
Civil War and Reconstruction (New York, 193 7), 124; Merle Curti and others,
An American History (2 vols., New York, 1950) I, 518; Ralph V. Harlow, The
Growth of the United States (2 vols., New York, 1943 ), I, 458-59.
4 The last three textbooks mentioned in the preceding footnote. But, Ran
dall, in a flash back on page 129, says the "principle of popular sovereignty"
had been applied.
5 Clement Eaton, A History of the Old South (New York, 1949), 544;
John D. Hicks, The Federal Union (New York, 1952), 498, 525; Homer C.
Hockett, The Constitutional History of the United States (2 vols., New York,
193 9), II, 226-228; F. L. Paxson, History of the American Frontier, 1763-/893
(Boston, 1924), 379-80; George M. Stephenson, American History to 1865
(New York, 1940), 498; Carl B. Swisher, American Constitutional Develop
ment (Boston, 1943), 239, 240.
6 Dwight L. Dumond, A History of the United States (New York, 1942),
390-94; A. H. Kelly and W. A. Harbison, The American Constitution: Its
Origin and Development (New York, 1948), 374; A. C. McLaughlin, A Con
stitutional History of the United States (New York, 193 5), 5 3 1- 3 4; Jeannette
P. Nichols and Roy F. Nichols, The Republic of the United States: A History
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status of slavery was to be until the Supreme Court should have
handed down its decision. In summary, twenty-two college textbooks
give at least twelve substantially different descriptions of the slavery
provisions of the New Mexico and Utah territorial acts of 1850.
If we turn from the textbooks to longer general accounts, we still
find indefiniteness or lack of agreement. Take, for one, James Ford
Rhodes's History of the United States from the Compromise of 1850.
Surprising as it may seem, although Rhodes devotes one hundred
pages to the enactment of the compromise measures, he nowhere
clearly states what the slavery provisions of the territorial bills were.
In one place he says the Omnibus Bill provided for territorial govern
ments "without the Wilmot proviso" and in another says the Utah
bill was "without the interdiction of slavery."7 These glimpses are
manifestly inadequate. In the good, substantial American Nation: A
History, the appropriate volume is George P. Garrison's Westward
Extension. It says: "The crux of the compromise was the territorial
clause of the New Mexico and Utah acts, which read as follows:
"Provided that, when ready for statehood, 'the said Territory ...shall
be admitted into the Union, with or without slavery, as their Con
stitution may prescribe at the time of admission.' "8 Since other books
state other provisions, Garrison's statement does not satisfy. Allan
evins's account of the Compromise of 1850 is even longer than
Rhodes's. Yet Nevins nowhere states clearly what provisions the com
promise measures contained relative to slavery in the territories. In
one place he implies that "the people of the Territories should be
allowed to decide for themselves whether they should have slavery."
In another place he indicates that the territorial acts were "without
any stipulations for or against slavery." In the next paragraph he
implies that the principle adopted was for Congress to refrain from
all legislation on the subject while the territories remained in the
territorial stage, "leaving it to the people of such Territory, when
they have attained to a condition which entitles them to admission

(2 vols., New York, 1942), I, 500; Fred W. Welborn, The Growth of Ameri
can Nationality, 1492-1865 (New York, 1943), 751. I have no quarrel with
the account by Kelly and Harbison or that by Wellborn on any consequential
matter.
7 James Ford Rhodes, History of the United States from the Compromise
of 1850 (7 vols., New York, 1893-1906), I, 99-198. The quotations are from
pages 172 and 181.
8 George P. Garrison, Westward Extension, 1841-1850 (New York, 1906),
331.

-9-

as a State, to decide for themselves the question of the allowance
or prohibition of domestic slavery."9
If there is a published monograph devoted to the Compromise of
1850 and including its territorial aspects, the present writer has been
unable to find it.There is, however, one good scholarly article.It was
by the late Frank Heywood Hodder and is entitled "The Authorship
of the Compromise of 1850."10 As the title suggests, Professor Hodder
was principally concerned with determining the authorship of various
parts of the compromise; but incidentally he outlined the main
features of the compromise and, it is believed, in a generally satis
factory manner.This article has been insufficiently noticed by those
who have written on the subject.
There is no sufficient justification for the failure of our historians
to agree substantially as to what were the slavery provisions of the
New Mexico and Utah acts. A careful reading of the acts themselves
and their legislative history seems to make them entirely clear. The
legislative history of a law does not determine its meaning; but it
helps us to locate the germane parts, and it usually is our best avail
able supporting evidence as to the intent of the framers.
The New Mexico act contained eighteen sections exclusive of the
one about the Texas boundary; the Utah act contained seventeen
sections. Except for names and boundaries the two acts were practically
identical. Most of the sections were stock; that is, they were identical,
or nearly so, with the corresponding sections of earlier territorial acts,
of which there had been a large number. Only those few sections which
contained references to slavery need detain us here. I I
One section (number 5 of the New Mexico act, 4 of the Utah)
vested the legislative power and authority of the territory in "the
governor and a legislative assembly." This was a stock clause. It gave
the governor the veto power.
Another section (number 7 in the New Mexico act, 6 in the Utah)
read as follows: "... the legislative power of the Territory shall ex-

9 Allan Nevins, The Ordeal of the Union (2 vols., New York, 1947), I,
229-345. The quotations are from pages 273 and 311-12.

Frank H. Hodder, "The Authorship of the Compromise of 1850," in
), XXII (March
1936), 525-36.
IO

Mississippi Valley Historical Review (Cedar Rapids, 191411

The texts are conveniently found in Francis Newton Thorpe (comp.),

The Federal and State Constitutions, Colonial Charters, and Other Organic
Laws ... (7 vols., Washington, 1909), V, 2615-22 (New Mexico), VI, 3687-

93 (Utah).
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tend to all rightful subjects of legislation, 12 consistent with the Con
stitution of the United States and the provisions of this act; but no
law shall be passed interfering with the primary disposal of the soil;
no tax shall be imposed upon the property of the United States; nor
shall the lands or other property of nonresidents be taxed higher than
the lands or other property of residents. All the laws passed by the
legislative assembly and governor shall be submitted to the Congress of
the United States and,if disapproved, shall be null and of no effect."
These were innocent-looking clauses, but they were the ones that
packed the dynamite. They meant and were intended to mean that
the territorial legislatures might legislate on the subject of slavery
either to prohibit it,or to establish it,or to regulate it.The legislative
history of the bills makes this so clear that he who runs may read.
In the Senate Henry Clay's famous eight resolutions outlining a
proposed general settlement of all the matters then in dispute were
referred along with sundry other resolutions and bills to a select com
mittee of thirteen. The committee of thirteen reported two bills and
an amendment to another. One bill was the so-called Omnibus Bill.
It covered the matters of California, the territories of New Mexico and
Utah, and the Texas-New Mexico boundary.As to the territories, the
Omnibus Bill contained the stock sections just quoted, but with the
insertion of SL"< words that altered their whole character in so far as
slavery was concerned.The six words were "nor in respect to African
slavery,"and they were so inserted as to make the bill read: " ... the
legislative power ... shall extend to all rightful subjects of legislation
... but no law shall be passed interfering with the primary disposal
of the soil, nor in respect to African slavery."13 This wording recog
nized that slavery was a "rightful " subject of legislation but forbade
the territorial legislatures to touch it.
This restriction on the legislatures had been put in by a bare
majority of the committee over the opposition of Clay, Lewis Cass,
and others.14 Efforts to get the restriction removed in the Senate
were staunchly resisted. Strongly antislavery senators wanted the
clause retained because they believed it would leave the Mexican
laws in effect; those laws prohibited slavery. Strongly proslavery sen
ators also favored the retention of the restriction. They believed that
12 All italics are mine throughout this article except where they are con
ventional.
13 The text of the controversial portions of the Omnibus Bill as reported
from the committee of thirteen is in Cong. Globe, 31Cong., 1Sess., 947-48.
14

Ibid.,

948-50, 955, 1003, 1829-30, App., 902, 1463
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Mexican laws had ceased to have validity when the Treaty of Gua
dalupe Hidalgo had gone into effect and that the courts would so
hold. They believed that the territories were accordingly without
valid laws prohibiting slavery at the time and the restrictive clause
would prevent the legislatures from enacting any new laws inimical to
the institution. Thus there was in the Senate for a time an unnatural
combination of Northern and Southern extremists against moderates.
The clause forbidding the legislatures to legislate on the subject
of slavery remained in the Omnibus Bill for many weary weeks. It was
modified somewhat. On June 5 Stephen A. Douglas moved in the
committee of the whole to strike it out. His motion was defeated 21
to 33.15 Eventually, though, the friends of compromise discovered that
the retention of the restriction was likely to kill the bill. On July 30
Moses Norris, Democrat of New Hampshire, moved again, in the
whole Senate, to strike it out, and this time the motion carried 32 to
19, after nearly two days of thorough debate.16 The restriction on the
legislatures having been removed, it was understood by all concerned
that the legislatures were left entirely free to legislate on slavery as
well as on all other "rightful" subjects not expressly removed from
their province by the bill. It is difficult to see how there ever could
come to be any other understanding of the meaning of this provision
and of the intent of the majority in Congress.
As for the veto power of the territorial governors and the provision
that laws passed by the legislatures and approved by the governors
might nevertheless be disallowed by Congress, little was said in the
debates. A governor's veto or a congressional disallowance of a law
on the matter of slavery was apparently considered a remote con
tingency.17 Furthermore, the veto and the disallowance had to be
included to prevent Utah from legalizing polygamy.
Let us turn now to the provisions of the territorial laws that pro
vided for or related to appeals to the Supreme Court of the United
States in cases involving slaves or slavery in the territories. The provis
ions are rather long, but it is necessary to quote them. After the usual
provisions for setting up territorial courts, prescribing their jurisdictions,
1s Ibid., I 134, 1135.
16 Ibid., 1482, 1490, App., 1463-73.
17 They were mentioned, however. Ibid., App., 1469, remarks of John M.
Berrien of Georgia and Solomon W. Downs of Louisiana. In order to make
squatter sovereignty more nearly complete, the framers of the Kansas-Nebraska
Act ( 1854) permitted the legislature to pass laws over the governor's veto by a
two-thirds majority and omitted the requirement that laws be submitted to
Congress for approval..

-12-

and regulating appeals from one to another and to the Supreme
Court of the United States, the territorial acts continued:
... except only that in all cases involving title to slaves, the said writs
of error or appeals shall be allowed and decided by the said Supreme
Court [of the United States] without regard to the value of the matter,
property, or title in controversy; and except also that a writ of error or
appeal shall also be allowed to the Supreme Court of the United States
from the decision of the said Supreme Court created by this act, or of
any judge thereof, or of the District Courts created by this act, or of
any judge thereof, upon any writ of habeas corpus involving the ques
tion of personal freedom; . ..and the said Supreme and District Courts
of the said Territory, and the respective judges thereof, shall and may
grant writs of habeas corpus in all cases in which the same are grantable
by the judges of the United States in the District of Columbia.18
Another provision that was closely related to the matter of judicial
determination and appeals was, as stated in the Utah act: " ...the
Constitution and laws of the United States are hereby extended over
and declared to be in force in said Territory of Utah, so far as the
same, or any provision thereof, may be applicable." The correspond
ing provision of the New Mexico act was different in wording but
identical in meaning.19
What did these detailed provisions mean, and why were they put
in the New Mexico and Utah acts? It is again necessary to turn to
their legislative history.
Southerners of the stricter states' rights school had lately espoused
a view or doctrine with regard to slavery in the territories which may
be labeled, in default of a better term, the property-rights doctrine.It
was briefly this: Under the Constitution, the territories are the com
mon property of the states that comprise the Union. The federal gov
ernment is only the agent of the states in administering that property
and must administer it for the benefit of all the states. The citizens of
the several states have the constitutional right to go into the common
territories and take with them the property, of whatever classes, they
have legally held in their respective states. In the territories they have
the right to continue to hold that property and be protected in its
possession and use by the laws, the courts, and the police officers of
the territories. According to this doctrine, slaveholders from slave
holding states of the Union had the right to take their slaves into the
territories and there hold them as slaves and control them and have

18 Sec. 10 in the New Mexico act, sec. 9 in the Utah.
19 Sec. 1 7 in both acts.
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protection for their property therein.20 Whether the proponents of
this doctrine thought it also a constitutional right for citizens from
slaveholding states to have property in children born of slave mothers
in the territories and to buy and sell slaves there does not clearly ap
pear; but presumably they did.
The advocates of the property-rights doctrine made persistent and
determined efforts to get their view accepted by Congress and embod
ied in the Omnibus Bill and every other territorial bill. They were
always defeated by substantial majorities. No Northern senator or rep
resentative accepted their view of the Constitution, and many Southern
Whigs and .Jacksonian Democrats, including Clay, Thomas Hart
Benton, and Alexander H. Stephens, also rejected it. In the course
of the debates, however, Clay and others frequently reminded their
states' rights colleagues that the courts were open and that, if their
doctrine was sound, the courts would no doubt so decide.2 1 Thereupon
the proponents of the property-rights doctrine turned their efforts, as
second best, to ( 1) clearing the way for an early test of their conten
tion in the courts and ( 2) insuring that, if the prospective court decision
should be in their favor, slavery would have the protection not only
of the courts but of positive law and the police officers of the territories
as well. Southern congressmen frankly admitted that, no matter what
the Supreme Court might say, slavery could not exist in the territories
unless sustained by positive law and effective police action.22
It will be remembered that the Omnibus Bill in its original form
forbade the territorial legislatures of New Mexico and Utah to legis
late "in respect to African slavery." After long and bitter debates the
advocates of the property-rights doctrine prevailed upon the Senate
to accept an amendment proposed by John M. Berrien of Georgia,
which made the clause in question read: "The legislative power of
said territory shall extend to all rightful subjects of legislation ... but
no law shall be passed ...establishing or prohibiting African slavery."
This rewording was understood to leave the territorial legislatures with
the power, and presumably the duty, to enact legislation to protect

20 This doctrine had first been clearly stated by Robert Barnwell Rhett of
South Carolina in the House, January 15, 1847. Cong. Globe, 29 Cong., 2 Sess.,
App., 244-46. John C. Calhoun embodied it in a set of resolutions, February
I 9, 1847. Ibid., 455. During the debates on the compromise measures, the best
expositions of the doctrine were made by Senator Berrien of Georgia, a former
attorney general of the United States. See especially his speech of February 1112, 1850. Ibid., 31 Cong., l Sess., App., 202-11.
21 Ibid., 31 Cong., l Sess., 1004, App., 424.
22 Ibid., 1004 (Jefferson Davis), App., 1386 (Robert M. T. Hunter).
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property in slaves if the courts should decide that under the Constitu
tion slavery was legal in all the territories of the United States and
might not be prohibited. The vote on the amendment was 30 to 27. 2 3
On June 6 David L. Yulee of Florida proposed, also as an amend
ment to the Omnibus Bill: "That the Constitution and laws of the
United States are hereby extended over, and declared to be in force in
the said territory of Utah, so far as the same or any provision thereof
may be applicable." Yulee explained his object clearly. He was trying,
as he supposed those who had voted for the Berrien amendment had
been, to put the bill in the same form as the proposed Clayton com
promise of 1848. The idea of John M. Clayton's bill had been "to
throw both parties on their constitutional rights, removing all obstruc
tions to a fair test, and facilitating an early trial." Daniel Webster and
others had contended that the Constitution did not extend to the
territories ex proprio vigore. The courts might take the same view. To
narrow the issue to rights under the Constitution and permit no side
stepping, Yulee was proposing to extend the Constitution to the
territories. His amendment was adopted 30 to 24.24
Then with John P. Hale of New Hampshire, a Free Soiler, taking
the leading part, the Senate adopted the careful provisions, quoted
above, on appeals from the territorial courts to the Supreme Court
of the United States. These were designed to insure that no conceiv
able sort of case involving the alleged constitutional right of slave
holders to take slaves into the territories concerned and hold them in
servitude should be finally decided by any court except the highest
court in the land. These provisions were adopted without a division. 2 5
The prevailing idea seems to have been that, if the states' rights people
were to have their day in court, it must be in the highest court and
with no obfuscation of the issue.
As the Omnibus Bill then stood, it still forbade the territorial leg
islatures to establish slavery or to prohibit it, and it neither affirmed
nor denied the validity of Mexican laws on the subject. But on July
31, as we have already seen, the Senate struck out the restriction on
the power of territorial legislatures and left them with full power to
legislate on slavery as a "rightful subject," subject to veto by a governor

23 Ibid., 1003-1007, 1018-19, 1083-88, 1113-22, 1131-34, 1379, Aop., 1467
( Berrien's explanation).
Ibid., 1144-46.
But after an illuminating debate. Ibid., 31 Cong., I Sess., 1212, 137980, 1585, App., 897-902. The judiciary provisions as finally adopted were al
most identical with those of the Clayton Bill of 1848. The text of the latter
is in Cong. Globe, 30 Cong., 1 Sess., 1002-1005.
24
25
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or disapproval by Congress itself. In what status did this leave the
provision for appeals to the Supreme Court?
In the first place it should be entirely clear that Congress did not
try to wash its hands of the question of slavery in the territories and
leave it to the Supreme Court. It gave power to legislate upon the
subject to the territorial legislatures, gave power to veto legislation
upon the subject to territorial governors ( officials appointed by the
President with the consent of the Senate), and itself retained the
right to disallow such legislation. The appeals provisions meant only
that Congress recognized that a case might be got up to test the ex
tent of its power to legislate on the subject of slavery in the territories
and to confer upon a territorial legislature the power to prohibit or
restrict slavery and that Congress was willing to have its powers so
tested in the courts. No one in Congress suggested that the courts be
denied jurisdiction of any slave cases that might arise. Such a thing
has rarely been done.
The appeals provisions did not even insure that the Supreme Court
would have an early opportunity to pass upon the constitutional issues
that had been raised. The court must await an actual case; that might
be a long time coming. Presumably a case would reach the court in
some such manner as this: One of the territorial legislatures must
first either confirm the Mexican laws prohibiting slavery or enact
new ones to the same effect. Then a slaveowner from one of the states
of the Union must bring a slave he had owned there into the territory
and hold him or attempt to hold him in servitude. Next, the alleged
slave must sue the master or would-be master in a court of the territory
for false arrest, or charge him with assault and battery, or apply to a
judge for a writ of habeas corpus directed to the person who was hold
ing him in servitude. Finally, the territorial court must make a decision
and the decision be appealed to the Supreme Court of the United
States. In fact no case involving "title to slaves" or "the question of
personal freedom" ever came to the Supreme Court from either New
Mexico or Utah. The famous Dred Scott case, which was made to
involve the powers of Congress as to slavery in the territories, came
by a different route.
Congress did not give a pledge in the New Mexico and Utah acts
to carry out the decision of the Supreme Court if that decision should
uphold the property-rights doctrine. That is another sort of thing that
is not done. Southern defenders of the doctrine did not ask for such a
pledge. They had reason, however, to presume that Congress would
take whatever measures might seem necessary to secure citizens in
their constitutional rights as those rights should be defined by the
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Supreme Court in its interpretation of the Constitution. And Southern
people were entitled to be disappointed and embittered when their
Northern brethren refused to abide by and carry out that decision as
they did refuse to accept and implement the Dred Scott decision.
Another section of the territorial bills (number 2 of the New Mexico
act, 1 of the Utab) contained this provision: "... when admitted as
a State, the said territory, or any portion of the same, shall be received
into the Union, with or without slavery, as their constitution may
prescribe at the time of their admission." What did this section amount
to? Let us again look at the record.
The statehood provision was first introduced, with different word
ing, by Senator Pierre Soule of Louisiana, June 15, as an amendment
to the Omnibus Bill. Soule's declared object was to try to put Northern
senators and representatives on record as promising not to oppose the
admission of a slave state if one should apply. His amendment was
adopted by a vote of 38 to 12 in the Senate after a protracted argu
ment as to what its use would be. The House refused by a vote of 58
to 85 to strike it out. 26 Only strong Wilmot Proviso men voted against
the amendment. They refused to make any pledge, and they told Soule
that the amendment was useless, since one Congress could not bind a
successor.Other senators seemed to think there was little likelihood that
a qualified territory would be refused admission to statehood because
of a constitution permitting slavery and, therefore, Soule's amendment
was immaterial. Thus the statehood part of the Compromise of 1850
was a promise by one Congress that a later Congress would not refuse
to admit Utah, or New Mexico, or any part thereof for the reason that
it would come into the Union as a slave state.That promise was in
tended to be reassuring to the South. It was certainly not the "crux of
the compromise." 2 7
The statehood provision did not mean, as so many books imply,
that Congress was conferring upon new states the right to decide for
themselves whether they should be slave or free.The Constitution gave
them the right. Almost everyone in Congress recognized that they
possessed the right. That had practically been demonstrated and agreed
upon thirty years before at the time of the Missouri Compromise.
When informed people of the day used the term "squatter sover-

26 Ibid., 31 Cong., 1 Sess., 1238-39, 1379, 1773, App., 902-11 (debate).
27 Those who have exaggerated the importance of this provision have per
haps been led to do so by a misleading passage in Alexander H. Stephens, A
Constitutional View of the Late War Beween the States ( 2 vols., Philadelphia,
1870), II, 217-20.
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eignty" or "popular sovereignty" they meant the right of a territory
( not of a State) to decide for itself what to do with regard to slavery
during the territorial stage. Congress in the Utah and New Mexico
acts gave the power to make that decision to the legislatures of the
respective territories. No other method of exercising "squatter sover
eignty" can properly be wrung out of the acts.
The slavery provisions of the New Mexico and Utah acts differed
considerably from Henry Clay's proposals in his famous eight compro
mise resolutions. They differed still more widely from the provisions of
the Omnibus Bill as originally reported by the committee of thirteen.
No one man was their author-neither Clay, nor Webster, nor
Douglas. 28 They were hammered out line by line and word by word in
the Senate by sixty men every one of whom had very definite ideas as
to just what they should be and many of whom were among the best
constitutional lawyers in the country. The House did not materially
change any of these slavery provisions as they came from the Senate. 29
The House influenced them, however; for the Senate leaders in charge
were in constant touch with House leaders and knew rather well what
the House would accept and what it would not accept.30 Passage in
the House was recognized as the big hurdle.
Now let us summarize the slavery provisions of the New Mexico and
Utah acts and their intent. First and principally, the territorial legis
latures were given full power to legislate on slavery, subject to a
possible veto by the governor or a possible disallowance by Congress.
That was squatter or popular sovereignty. Second, if one or both of the
territories should prohibit slavery and if any sort of a slave case should

28 Cf. Hodder, "The Authorship of the Compromise of 1850," and Holman
Hamilton, "Democratic Senate Leadership and the Compromise of 1850," in
Mississippi Valley Historical Review. XLI (December 1954), 403-18.
29 It has not seemed necessary to follow the fortunes of the various bills
here. The succession is made very clear in Professor Hodder's article. Briefly:
The Committee on Territories, Stephen A. Douglas, chairman, put California
in one bill and the matters of the Texas-New Mexico boundary and the organ
ization of New Mexico and Utah territories in another. The committee of
thirteen, not Clay, put all these matters in one bill, the so-called Omnibus.
The provisions in regard to slavery in the territories were hammered out in
perfecting the territorial parts of the Omnibus Bill. The Senate, not Douglas,
broke up the Omnibus Bill into four, not five, bills. The House united the
Senate Texas Boundary and New Mexico bills, and the Senate accepted this
combination. The matters of fugitive slaves and slave trading in the District
of Columbia had never been in the Omnibus Rill. These are simple and not
very important matters; but most books mention them, and few get them
straight.
30 Hodder, "The Authorship of the Compromise of 1850," and George
Fort Milton, The Eve of Conflict: Stephen A. Douglas and the Needless War
(Boston, 19 34), chs., iv, v, give numerous illustrations.
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arise under that prohibition, the case could go on appeal to the
Supreme Court, could not be withheld therefrom because of any tech
nicality Congress had been able to foresee, and the Supreme Court
would then have to pass on the question whether Congress had the
power under the Constitution to exclude slavery from the territories or
to confer upon a territorial legislature the power to do so. Third, a
promise was given that a future Congress would not refuse to admit
New Mexico, Utah, or any part thereof as a state for the reason that
it would be a slave state or that it would be a free state.
These were the slavery provisions of the New Mexico and Utah
acts. It is understood, of course, that the provisions were not the
compromise. The essence of compromise is mutual concessions for the
sake of agreement. To know what the compromise was, we must know
who conceded what. But one cannot determine what the Compromise
of 1850 was until he knows what the provisions of the compromise
measures were.
It is admitted, as a possibility, that the slavery provisions of the
territorial acts could have been themselves a concession by one side to
secure the consent of the other to the passage of one or more of the
other compromise measures. It is believed, however, that the territorial
acts did contain mutual concessions, that these concessions were an
important part of the Compromise of 1850, and that in the main the
territorial bills stood on their own merits. It is true that a number of
senators and representatives voted for them as a part of a general
scheme of adjustment who would not have done so if they had stood
entirely alone.
Let us look first at the slavery provisions of the territorial acts from
the viewpoint of the proslavery people. Strongly proslavery men had
been determined that the territories should be opened to slavery. They
were striving desperately to get new slave states into the Union so that
they could maintain a balance in the United States Senate friendly to
their "peculiar institution." They had long since lost control of the
House. They thought they must maintain a balance, or something ap
proaching a balance, in the Senate if they were to continue to ward
off federal legislation inimical to slavery. They believed slaveholders
had a constitutional right to take slaves into the territories and hold
them and that neither Congress nor a territorial legislature could
constitutionally deny them that right. Slaveholders did not want to be
denied any rights. They did not want to be denied the opportunity
to settle in the territories if the territories should prove attractive. Most
proslavery people saw nothing in the climate or soil of Utah and New
Mexico or in the occupations or probable occupations of the settler�
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to make slavery impractical or unprofitable there; and, indeed, there
was nothing. 3 1 They believed that if these territories could be opened to
slavery, slaveholders would move into them with their slaves, and, in
due course of time, the majority of the people there would come to
accept slavery and the territories would become slave states. The ter
ritorial acts held out only a modicum of hope to these men.
The territorial acts did not open the territories to slavery. They
neither explicitly nor implicitly recognized the alleged constitutional
right of slaveholders from states of the Union to take slaves into the
territories and hold them in slavery there. The territories had been free
under Mexican laws and were likely to remain free. There was only a
bare chance that a large enough number of Southern people friendly
to slavery would migrate into the territories to get laws enacted in one
or both territories legalizing slavery. There was also only a bare
possibility that the appeals provisions would bear fruit. Some slave
holder might assume the risk of taking slaves into one of the territories
and trying to hold them there in violation of the laws against slavery,
which in all probability would prevail. In such an event, a test case
would go to the Supreme Court. If then the Supreme Court should
decide that the property-rights view of the Constitution was valid, as
extreme states' rights people hoped and professed to believe it would,
the territories would be legally open to slavery. Then, if the Supreme
Court decision could be implemented by territorial or federal legisla
tion, the territories would actually be open to slavery. Then, if slavery
should flourish there, the territories might someday become slave
states.32 These possibilities were slender comfort to the South.
Only one feature of the territorial acts, in so far as they affected
slavery, was entirely satisfactory to all proslavery men: There was
nothing in the acts which pronounced or even implied a moral judg
ment against slavery. 33 Practically all the Southern people had been
determined that nothing should be put in an act of Congress stigma31 I have argued at some length the point of what determined the profit
ability of slaveholding in "The Economic History of Negro Slavery in the
United States," in Agricultural History ( Chicago, I 927- ) , XI ( October
1937), 308-21. Cf. Charles W.Ramsdell, "The Natural Limits of Slavery Ex
pansion," in Mississippi Valley Historical Review, XVI (September 1929), 15171.
32 After the Dred Scott Decision ( 1857) had been made, the legislature of
New Mexico enacted a law for the protection of slave property. The Census
of 1860 showed no slaves in New Mexico, 29 in Utah, 2 in Kansas, and 15 in
Nebraska.
33 One of Clay's compromise resolutions had implied a reproach: "as
slavery does not exist by law, and is not likely to be introduced into any terri
tory acquired ... from Mexico, it is inexpedient for congress to provide by
law either for its introduction into, or exclusion from, any part of said territory."
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t1zmg slavery as an institution unfit to be extended to new territory.
That would have been almost universally regarded in the South as an
insult which was "not to be borne" and which would call for resistance
to the "last extremity." With the Senate constituted as it was in 1850,
there had never been any considerable danger that the Wilmot Proviso
itself would be adopted. The largest vote that it received in any form
in the critical session was twenty-five in a possible sixty, and that
not-withstanding the fact that thirty senators were under instructions
from state legislatures to vote for it. 34 The danger had been that
California would be admitted with its free-state constitution and
nothing would be done about settling the territorial question. But the
absence from the bills of any sort of "taunt or reproach" was a matter
of genuine satisfaction to the Southern people generally. It was suf
ficient to satisfy that large number who believed the best strategy to
pursue in defense of slavery was to refrain from any aggressive cam
paign to extend the limits of slave territory.
Now let us consider the territorial acts from the viewpoint of anti
slavery people. Strongly antislavery men had been determined that
slavery should not go into the territories under any circumstances. They
made it a matter of conscience to vote against any provision that would
create even a bare possibility of the extension of slavery. They believed
slavery would thrive in Utah and NewMexico if permitted there3 5
and the only way to be sure of keeping it out was by an act of Congress
absolutely prohibiting it. They were greatly disappointed, therefore, by
their failure to attach the Wilmot Proviso to the territorial acts.
Milder antislavery people could reconcile themselves to squatter
sovereignty in the two particular territories; though not as a general
principle applicable to all territories. They could persuade themselves
that the existing populations-Mexicans in NewMexico,Mormons in
Utah-were so firm in their opposition to slavery that they would
never let it get started among them. They were strongly reassured on
this point when a convention held in NewMexico during the very time
the great struggle was going on in Congress framed a constitution for
the prospective state which forbade slavery.3 6 Or antislavery men of
34 Lewis Cass and Alpheus Felch of Michigan, Daniel S. Dickinson of New
York, and Webster made no pretense of obeying their instructions. Several
other senators, Douglas for one, technically obeyed them but worked for com
promise. They often absented themselves when the Proviso was being voted on.
35 See, for example, statement of William H. Seward in his "Higher Law"
speech, March 11, Cong. Globe, 31 Cong., 1 Sess., App., 266.
36 Roger S. Baldwin, Whig of Connecticut, gave this as a reason why he
had reversed his position on the proposed squatter-sovereignty provision be
tween June 5 and July 31. Ibid., App., 1472.
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the milder sort could persuade themselves, as Webster seems to have,
that slavery was excluded from these territories by "an ordinance of
nature." Still milder antislavery men could further salve their con
sciences, if that was necessary, by rationalizing that they might as well
leave the determination of the status of slavery to the territorial
legislatures in the first place, for those bodies would determine it in the
long run anyway.37 As for the possibility under the territorial acts that
a case might be taken to the Supreme Court and the court might
decide in favor of the property-rights view of the Constitution, anti
slavery people could reassure themselves in several ways: The likelihood
that a case would get to the court was remote. At any rate a citizen
must have the opportunity to take a question of constitutional rights
to court. That could have been done even though the Wilmot Proviso
had been in the laws, and the issue would have been substantially the
same.38 In any event the Supreme Court was not likely to accept the
property-rights doctrine; for the power of Congress to legislate for the
territories in the matter of slavery or let them legislate for themselves
was sustained by the practice of over sixty years.
It is a testimonial to the great skill with which the slavery provis
ions of the territorial bills had been framed that no one, North or South,
had to vote contrary to his deep-seated feelings or convictions on
slavery in order to get the bills passed. No antislavery man had to vote
affirmatively to permit slavery where it was already prohibited. No
Northern representative could have brought himself to do that, and
several Southerners, including Clay and Benton, could not have done
it either. No antislavery man had to feel that by his vote he was even
making probable the establishment of slavery in a region where it did
not already exist. No proslavery man had to vote directly to exclude
slavery anywhere. No proponent of the property-rights view of slavery
in the territories had to betray his views. Of course, many members of
both houses and of both sections could not bring themselves to make
even the limited concessions of principle or interests necessary to vote
for these acts, and they opposed them to the end. The acts, passed over
their stubborn opposition by substantial majorities in the Senate and
narrow in the House.
It would be futile to attempt to say which side came off the better
in the territorial acts. They were a compromise. The late Professor
37 This was the line taken by Douglas and William A. Richardson of Illi
nois. Ibid., App., 369- 7 0, 423 .
38 The Dred Scott case actually arose in Missouri, and judges examined
the constitutionality of the provision in the Missouri Compromise of 1820 pro
hibiting slavery in a portion of the Louisiana Purchase.
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Hodder thought "The Compromise was more largely ... a southern
measure than a northern one." He had reference to the compromise
measures as a whole.39 As to the territorial bills alone, there is no
question that a larger proportion of Southern Congressmen than of
Northern voted for them. In the Senate 21 Southerners voted for the
Utah bill, and only 2 against it; 11 Northern men voted for it, and 16
against it. In the House 56 Southerners voted for it, and 15 against it;
41 Northerns voted for it, and 70 against it.40 But this distribution by
no means proves that the territorial acts were more favorable to the
proslavery cause. The proslavery party was the weaker of the two.
Proslavery men had to make greater concessions to effect a settlement.
They were more in need of an immediate settlement. Time and the
trend of events favored the other side.

39 Hodder, "The Authorship of the Compromise of 1850," 535.
40 Cong. Globe, 31 Cong., 1 Sess., App., 1485 (Senate vote), 1776 (House).
The votes on the Utah bill were more of a test on the slavery provisions than
those on the New Mexico bill, for the latter was always involved with the
Texas boundary dispute.
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A

NY DESCRIPTION of the economic characteristics of Negro
slavery must be tested by the economic history of the institution.
In turn the economic history of Negro slavery, to be truthful, must be
written with the inherent characteristics of slavery and the native traits
of Negroes in mind. It also should be written whole, and it should be
written with the general economic history of the entire country as a
background. Thus, it is at least possible to avoid attributing conditions
in one period of history or in one portion of the Union to slavery while
attributing the same conditions in another period or in another region
to entirely different causes. It is believed that many misjudgments have
been commonly pronounced upon slavery in its economic aspects and
that such misinterpretations have been due principally to a too exclusive
concern with slavery in only one section of the Union during only one
period, namely about 1830 to 1865, and to using the approach of
political rather than economic history.
Slavery was first introduced into the Continental English Colonies
in response to the demands of the tobacco-growing industry. It was
early found that the soil and climate of Virginia and Maryland, par
ticularly, were suitable for growing tobacco. Tobacco was not bulky
in proportion to its value, it was not perishable, and the small ships
of the day could collect it from the wharves of individual planters on
the numerous rivers and creeks of the Tidewater region; consequently,
it would stand the long shipment to Europe. The English Government
imposed discriminatory taxes on tobacco not grown in English colonies
and forbade its growth in the British Isles. The English and European
appetite for the weed grew. Thus an adequate market was established.
Enterprising tobacco growers in the Colonies naturally looked about
to see how they might enlarge the scale of their operations.
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Land and labor were the chief requisites for growing tobacco on a
large scale. Land was easily obtained, but labor was not. Men would
not work for wages when it was so easy to become independent farmers.
Planters first had recourse to white indentured servants, and the plan
tations in Virginia and Maryland in the seventeenth century were built
up chiefly with that kind of labor, but it was not entirely satisfactory.
To secure such servants the planters had to pay their passage to Amer
ica,-a considerable sum. The supply was limited and many were "jail
birds" or poor quality. ! A large proportion died before they had be
come acclimated. At best they served only the period of indenture-
about four years on the average-and then they were free and their
children with them.
The use of Negro slaves elsewhere suggested their use in the English
Colonies. The English Government encouraged it, prompted largely
by the desire of various influential people at home to profit by the
African slave trade. The tobacco planters were hesitant; they had to
overcome racial prejudice and gain experience in handling slaves.
Although Negroes fresh from Africa or from a few years' sojourn in
the West Indies were not as effective laborers as their descendants
came to be a few generations later, they could be taught the compara
tively simple operations involved in colonial agriculture, the supply
was adequate, and they were comparatively cheap. In the tobacco and
corn fields the slaves could be worked in gangs and readily supervised.
They could be advantageously employed on the plantations the year
around, and the women and children could be used as well as the men.
Perhaps most decisive of all, they throve and multiplied, and they
served for life and their children after them, thus giving planters
reasonable assurance that their labor forces would not melt away.
Restraints, therefore, were gradually broken down, and slavery event
ually came to be firmly established in the tobacco belt.
For similar reasons, and without the preliminary indentured-servant
stage, rice and indigo plantations with Negro slave labor developed in
the eighteenth century in the Carolinas and Georgia. In the case of
rice growing, an added inducement to employ slaves was that they
stood the fevers of the swamps better than whites.
The New England Colonies were unable to utilize slave labor in
their agriculture to any considerable extent. It was not because Puritan
consciences would not permit; they did not gag at the African slave
1 There is a difference of opm10n among students as to the quality of
these transported prisoners. See, for example, C. M. Andrews, Colonial Folk
ways, 190-194 (New Haven, 1919), and T. J. Wertenbaker, The First Ameri
cans, 1607-1690, p. 25 (New York, 1929).
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trade nor at selling captive Indians into slavery. Nor was it that more
intelligent labor was required to grow wheat, corn, beans, and pump
kins in New England than corn, tobacco, rice, and indigo in the South;
the Southern staples certainly required the greater care and skill. The
fundamental reason was that, except in a few localities, New England
farmers found no product for which there was a ready market. They
had, perforce, to produce only for home consumption and for the very
limited local markets. There was, therefore, little incentive for the New
England farmer to enlarge the scale of his operations to what can be
called plantation size. The members of the family, with extra help at
the harvest season drawn from the fisherfolk and from the artisans of
the towns and countryside, constituted an adequate labor force on the
small farm. Producing little that was salable and, therefore, having little
with which to buy, New England farm families were constrained to do
much household manufacturing, and Negro slaves were not so well
adapted to that.
If they had been tempted to use it, New England farmers would
have found Negro slave labor rather expensive, considering its low
efficiency, because of the cost of shelter, fuel, and clothing during the
winter months. The policies of land disposition initially adopted and
long continued in the New England Colonies were less conducive to
the accumulation of large holdings than were those of the Southern
Colonies; but it is not unreasonable to suppose that this handicap
would have been overcome if there had been strong inducements for
individuals to acquire large holdings for farming purposes.
In connection with the reasons why New England farmers did not
employ many slaves, it is an illuminating fact that neither did they use
many white indentured servants. It is very illuminating also that the
back-country districts of the South, being debarred from growing
staples by inaccessibility to markets, had a rural economy quite similar
to that of New England-with few plantations, little bound labor, and
much household manufacturing.
The chief New England industries which produced for commercial
markets and in which, therefore, there was an incentive to large-scale
operations, were fishing, lumbering, and ship building; shipping also
employed many men. It is almost obvious why Negro slaves could not
be used advantageously in such occupations. They required chiefly
strong men, and therefore complications concerning ownership of the
women and children would have arisen. They were largely seasonal;
and masters would have had difficulty in finding employment for their
slaves in off seasons. The risks to life and limb were great; and slaves,
unlike wage laborers, were capital and would have to be replaced by
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purchase. A large proportion of the workmen must be skilled and in
telligent, as in fishing, at least, men could not be worked in gangs and
closely supervised. Rude Africans could hardly be made into skilled
artisans to work at the numerous handicrafts of prefactory days. So
the chief employment of Negro slaves in New England was as menials;
and the rich or well-to-do who could and would afford such servants
were not numerous enough to utilize a large number.
The economy of the Middle Colonies was more like that of New
England than that of the South, but there were districts which pro
duced wheat or livestock for export, generally in the forms of flour or
biscuit and salted meats. In such districts plantations developed, and a
considerable number of slaves appeared, although not nearly so many
as were to be found farther south. Quakers were numerous in Penn
sylvania and New Jersey, and they had scruples, sometimes overcome,
against holding slaves. These colonies were fortunate also in getting a
large number of high-grade indentured servants from Germany. For
these reasons and perhaps others, indentured servants continued to be
more numerous than slaves in the Middle Colonies throughout the
eighteenth century.
The American Revolution, with its philosophy of equality and
inalienable rights of life, liberty, and pursuit of happiness, brought a
reaction against slavery. This reaction, together with the hostility of a
growing class of wage earners to slave competition, was sufficient to
bring about, within two decades, provision for either immediate or
gradual emancipation of the slaves in all the Northern States and to
dedicate the Old Northwest to freedom. 2
It was one of the accidents with which history abounds that, after
slavery had been abolished in the North, after a strong antislavery
sentiment had developed, and after the likelihood that the institution
should ever be reestablished was nil, industries developed there in
which slaves could have been employed to advantage had they been
available. They probably could have been used in the textile mills,
which sprang up in great numbers as the industrial revolution came
on. Such mills employed men, women, and children, and the operations
did not require skill beyond the capacity of Negroes to acquire. The
work was easily supervised, and the chances of loss by death or serious
injury were not great. Whether slaves would have been used in textile
factories is a different question. White free-labor was available and the
2 In 1795, John Adams said: "Arguments might have some weight in the
abolition of slavery in Massachusetts, but the real cause was the multiplication
of labouring white people, who would no longer suffer the rich to employ these
sable rivals as much to their injury."
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choice between the two classes would have been determined by a
variety of factors impossible to evaluate at this distance in time.3
As means of transportation improved and the growth of an indus
trial population expanded the home market for foodstuffs, Northern
agriculture became more commercialized and specialized along the
trade routes. Wheat came to be the chief market crop in extensive
areas; corn and hogs were stables in other localities. Slave labor might
not have proved to be as well adapted to the production of such com
modities as to the production of Southern staples.4 For example, swing
ing cradles in the wheat harvest might have been pretty strenuous
exercise for prime field hands, and apparently there would have been
difficulty in finding suitable employment for slave women and children
at some seasons of the year. But good soil, large yields, and fair prices
might easily haYe offset such minor defects in adaptability. As it was,
there was not a sufficient number of whites who would work for the
wages which farmers could offer, and Negro slaves were not available
at all; the plantation system was not developed, and the small farm
prevailed. But there is no good reason to doubt that, if slaves had been
available, they would have been utilized and plantations would have
developed.
In the South the sentimental reaction against slavery caused by the
Revolutionary philosophy coincided in time with a severe depression
in the tobacco industry and the decline of indigo. Under the double
impact, thousands of slaves were freed by their masters in Virginia and
Maryland, and in spite of the social dangers involved in freeing so
many still primitive people, these states might have followed the ex
ample of their Northern sisters had not the spectacular development
of the cotton-growing industry and the slightly less spectacular develop
ment of sugar-growing intervened.
The causes for the rise of the cotton-growing industry have often
been well told. The development of labor-saving machinery for spinning
and weaving in England and elsewhere lowered the prices of cotton
goods and thus stimulated the demand for them. Fut.her improvements
made it practicable to utilize short-staple cotton as well as long in
manufacturing cloth. Eli Whitney's famous invention made it possible
to gin short-staple cotton at a small fraction of the cost of ginning by
hand and thus to grow such cotton in America profitably at a price
manufacturers could afford to pay. Reduction in the cost of the raw

3

See p. 316-318 for suggestions.

See F. L. Olmsted, A Journey in the Back Country, 2: 103 ff. (New
York, 1907) for interesting contemporary speculations on this point.
4
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material still further reduced the prices of cotton goods, stimulating
the demand for them and, therefore, in turn, for raw cotton. Only a
few localities in the South were adapted to long-staple cotton, but vast
areas were as well adapted to the short-staple variety as any regions on
the globe. Land, the section's resources yet untaxed, remained cheap.
Cotton had a high value in proportion to bulk, and the South had
numerous navigable rivers on which it could be floated to the sea; so
the staple could stand the cost of transportation to distant markets
even before railroads penetrated the interior. As production increased
prices fell, but they were seldom so low that people forsook cotton for
other crops. Thanks to improved gins and plows and to the substitution
of the mule and the horse for ·the slow-moving ox, production costs
fell somewhat also. Prices and production fluctuated widely, making
the industry highly speculative; but this feature perhaps repelled few.
Finally cotton growing could utilize slave labor.
If ever any industry was made to order for Negro slavery, cotton
growing was. It occupied the slaves a large portion of the year as well,
if not better, than tobacco culture, and on farms and plantations the
interstices could easily be filled in with other necessary and not unpro
fitable tasks. Cotton growing could utilize men, women, and children
of all abilities and skills, the dullest and slowest as well as the quickest
and most intelligent. Although it lent itself well to the gang system and
to supervision, a large force was not essential. The cotton belt, except
for a few localities, was about as healthy as any other part of the Lower
South; and cotton growing could not be termed a dangerous occu
pation.
The sugar industry developed rapidly after Etienne de Bore had
demonstrated on his Louisiana plantation during 1794-95 that sugar
could be grown profitably in that region. On account of the vagaries
of the weather, production fluctuated widely from season to season,
making the industry even more speculative than cotton growing, but
frequently the profits were large. The industry remained confined
almost exclusively to lower Louisiana.
Sugar growing was not quite so well adapted to slavery as cotton.
It required a larger proportion of grown men in the gangs. Health con
ditions were not as good in the sugar belt as in most parts of the cotton
belt. For various reasons, especially the cost of sugar-making machinery
and of leveeing, it was a large-scale industry; the small slaveholder
could not engage in it. But it met most of the qualifications for the
profitable use of slaves. And because it was a large-scale industry, sugar
planters did not, as did cotton and tobacco planters, have any direct
competition from small farmers.
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The cotton-growing industry, reenforced by the sugar industry,
eventually employed an absolute majority of all the slaves in the
country and provided the chief market for slaves that were sold.
After the American Revolution the tobacco-growing industry, which
had employed the bulk of the slaves in Colonial days, did not again
enjoy real prosperity until the 1850's. Thousands of planters removed
with their slaves from the tobacco to the cotton belt. Slave prices were
always higher in the cotton and sugar areas than in the tobacco areas
with the result that most of the slaves sold in the latter were bought up
by traders who took them to the Lower South. This traffic, indeed,
reached such proportions that the abolitionists charged Virginians and
others with breeding slaves for sale. This charge, which was strongly
resented, was not true in the literal sense, but, no doubt, the money
received from the sale of surplus slaves enabled many a tobacco planter,
who otherwise must have removed from the tobacco belt or given up
slaveholding altogether, to go on year after year holding slaves and
raising tobacco. In general, if all the natural increase of the slave
population of the tobacco States had had to remain there, the tobacco
industry could not have absorbed them, and, unless other commercial
ized industries which could utilize slaves in sufficient numbers had
then sprung up, the surplus slaves would have been emancipated. It
was, therefore, principally the prosperity of cotton growing which
maintained slavery as a vigorous institution in the border slave States.
The rice industry grew steadily and utilized an increasing number
of slaves, and hemp was a product of slave labor in various localities.
Household service, in town and country, continued to absorb a con
siderable portion of the slave population.
As time went by there developed in the South other industries or
occupations which demanded labor bond or free. Steamboats were
operated, loaded, and unloaded, and railroads were built and operated.
A number of cotton factories sprang up, especially in the Carolinas and
Georgia, and there were saw mills, flour and grist mills, iron works, car
shops, and tobacco factories. Nearly all of the handicrafts of the time
were followed to a greater or less extent in the slaveholding States,
where they competed for labor against agriculture and domestic service,
and attracted some slave labor. Slaves were owned or hired in consid
erable numbers by artisans. Many a master hired out his slaves to
railroad contractors or went in person with his gang to work at railway
grading, and occasionally a railroad company would buy slaves for
construction and maintenance work. The Virginia tobacco factories
and iron works, and at least one cotton factory, the Saluda, in South
Carolina, successfully employed Negro slaves for several years. There
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was a protracted debate in Southern journals as to whether they could
be successfully utilized in factories and, if not, whether other labor
could be found, that is, whether the section could have an industrial
revolution or not.5
In general as time passed the class of white and, to a less extent,
free-Negro wage-labor grew, by immigration, transfer from agriculture,
and otherwise, and gradually took over a large proportion of such jobs,
especially the ones requiring skill, while the slaves were more and more
concentrated in staple agriculture and domestic service. During the
1850's the slave population of Baltimore, St. Louis, New Orleans, and
Charleston actually declined although those cities, except Charleston,
were growing rapidly, while in a number of other towns, including
Richmond, Savannah, Augusta, Memphis, Nashville, and Mobile, the
slave population declined relatively to the white.
The reasons for this partial displacement were various. Slaves
could not be so advantageously employed in some of the occupations
indicated as in agriculture. In some cases the character of the industry
would practically necessitate hiring labor instead of owning it-be
cause the work was seasonal or required quite unnatural proportions
of men, women, or children-and slaveowners were loath to entrust
their valuable slaves to the care of those whose interest would be to
exploit them to the limit. Some trades demanded more skill than
Negroes could readily acquire. The newly organized manufacturing
and railroad companies had trouble enough in raising capital for con
struction and equipment without saddling themselves with debts
incurred in buying hands. In some of the employments concerned, the
risks of loss of slaves by accident or disease were great; free laborers
usually bore their own risks. As towns grew and Negroes became more
sophisticated, it became increasingly difficult to control slaves. White
labor was becoming class conscious and demanding the exclusion of
slaves from various employments in which whites commonly engaged.6
The chief reasons why slaves retained almost a monopoly of
domestic service even in the towns were the disinclination of free-born
whites to do menial tasks and the preference of employers for servants
s Kathleen Bruce, Virginia Iron Manufacture in the Slave Era, ch. 6 (New
York and London, 1931 ) ; C. H. Wesley, Negro Labor in the United States,
1850-1925, ch. 1 (New York, 1927); U. B. Phillips, Amercian Negro Slavery,
37 5-378 (New York, 1918); Robert R. Rus,sel, Economic Aspects of Southern
Sectionalism, 1840-1861, ch. 2, "Movement for the Diversification of Industry,
1840-1852," p. 33-64 (Urbana, 111., 1923).
6 Wesley, Negro Labor in the United States, ch. 3; Bruce, Virginia Iron
Manufacture in the Slave Era, 236-237; Russel, Economic Aspects of Southern
Sectionalism, 53, 218-220.
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who would remain in their service more permanently than the average
hired domestic.
For various reasons a free-labor class did not develop as rapidly in
agricultural as in nonagricultural pursuits. White free labor had greater
relative advantages over Negro slave labor in the latter than in the
former and, therefore, as long as there was not enough for both,
naturally gravitated into the nonagricultural employments,-always
excepting domestic service. The skill required was usually greater than
in agriculture and consequently wages tended to be higher. The towns
had social attractions. Immigration from the North and from Europe
largely entered at the seaports and tended to stay there. In the towns
the varied nature of industry made it more practicable to provide
separate tasks or distinctions in task for whites and Negroes and thus
enable the whites to avoid feeling that they were doing slaves' work.
In the towns, with their denser population and more varied indus
try, employers could employ free labor and be reasonably assured of
constantly having a supply available. In the rural districts, however,
with their sparser population, planters hesitated to dispose of slaves
and engage wage labor because they did not feel assured of being able
to fill vacancies that were certain to arise. In other words, until there
should be a large free-labor class in the country, planters would fear
to rely upon it, and this fear would, in turn, prevent the class from
developing. The story is told of a sugar planter who, becoming disgusted
with slave labor, sold all his slaves and hired German and Irish immi
grants in their stead. During the first grinding season they struck
for double wages, and the planter went back to slaves.7
In the rural South it was still too easy for freemen to become
independent farmers for any large number to seek work for wages.
During the last decade before the War between the States, Southern
agriculture was so prosperous that, in spite of the shift of slaves from
town to country, demand greatly outran supply. Prices of slaves soared
to unheard of heights; smuggling from Africa was renewed; and
agitation began for a repeal of the laws against the foreign slave trade
( an agitation inspired in part by other than economic motives, to be
sure) . A large number of small white farmers increased their produc
tion of staples. Yet few whites, "poor" or otherwise, entered Southern
agriculture as wage earners.
If slavery could have been maintained in the South until the
growth of population and scarcity of land caused a large number of
white people of good quality to work for wages on farms and planta7

Phillips, American Negro Slavery, 337.
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tions, then, according to all the signs, employers would have preferred
the white wage-labor. And if, in such a case, a surplus of labor had de
veloped, slaves would have been set free, presumably, to shift for
themselves.
But, as has been so often remarked, although still frequently over
looked, the displacement of Negro slaves by white wage earners in any
branch of industry did not, or would not, prove that free labor in
general was superior to slave labor; it only proved that white labor of
a certain quality was superior to Negro slave labor of a certain quality
in a particular branch of industry.
The statement has frequently been made that Southern slaveowners
would have been well advised at some time before 1861 to free their
slaves and hire the freedmen back for wages. The proposal is manifestly
absurd if made applicable to a period before the Negroes had been in
America long enough to acquire the white men's ways and want to
live like them and not run off to the woods and swamps or join the
Indians. But even for later periods, if considered only in its economic
aspects, and if it is not assumed that the slaveholders should have fore
seen that persistence in slavery would lead to war and a long train of
consequences, the suggestion does not seem wise. In the country dis
tricts the freedmen, like the whites, would have desired to become
independent farmers, and, unless land ownership or leaseholding had
been denied them (something we have no right to assume), at least
the more capable and enterprising would have succeeded. The masters
would, therefore, have had a smaller labor force to exploit for their own
advantage, and furthermore, those Negroes '\ho had to earn their
living by working for wages would in all probability have been less
effective workers as freemen than they had ben as slaves.8 The aver
age Negro would have been content with a lower standard of living
and, consequently, would not have worked as regularly. He would have
been sick or ailing more frequently and would have lost considerable
time during the intervals between quitting his old jobs and finding
new ones.
These conclusions seem to have been borne out by experience after
the slaves were actually freed. The planters tried to continue their
plantations substituting wage labor for slave, but the experiment failed,
and they were forced to divide their landholdings into small farms,
which were rented out to white or Negro tenants, usually on a cropB M. B. Hammond, The Cotton Industry; An Essay in American Economic
History, 186 (New York, 1897); U. B. Phillips, "The Economics of Slave Labor
in the South," The South in the Building of the Nation, 5: 121 (Richmond, Va.,
1910).
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share system. Only as time passed and land values increased, have the
landowners been able to make better bargains with their tenants, and,
in the case of Negro tenants especially, to exercise such a degree of
supervision over them as to restore some of the advantages of the old
plantation system. If the slaves had been freed in more propitious
times, not in a country half-devasted by war and with ill feeling be
tween the races augmented by the events of the reconstruction period,
things might not have worked out in just the same way, but it is
unlikely that the result would have been substantially different.
Negro slavery was introduced into this country to meet a demand
for labor which could not be met as satisfactorily in any other manner.
It was long maintained for various reasons but chiefly because it con
tinued to satisfy the demand for labor, caused by the continued
scarcity of free white wage-earners. The introduction and per
petuation of Negro slavery do not prove that free whites were less
effective workers than Negro slaves.
It has often been asserted that, had it not been for the War be
tween the States and consequent abolition, slavery would soon have
died out anyway because of economic inadequacy. If the analysis
presented in this article is at all sound, this common judgment requires
much qualification. If the fate of Negro slavery had been left to be
determined solely by the economic interest of the master class, it is not
likely that it would have died a natural death for a long time. 9 But
the fate of the institution, even barring forces exercised from outside
the slaveholding States, would not have been determined solely by the
self-interest of the masters.
It is, of course, impossible to tell just what would have happened
if something else had not occurred, but certain tendencies are reason
ably clear. Southern society was not static. A free labor class was grow
ing and was becoming increasingly class conscious and hostile to slave
labor competition in one trade after another. As means of transporta
tion improved, a larger and larger part of the small-farmer class would
have been drawn into commercialized agriculture, and, losing hope of
acquiring slaves, would have become more antagonistic to the planters.
As means of transportation and communication developed, the Negroes
themselves would have grown more sophisticated, less satisfied with
their status, and more difficult to control as slaves. As the slaves became
more and more concentrated in the cotton and sugar belts, greater areas
in the South would have become "abolitionized." All of these "internal"

9 Cf. L. C. Gray, History of Agriculture in the Southern United States to
1860, 476 (Washington, 1933).
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dangers to the peculiar institution were recognized before the War by
the master class and thoroughly canvassed. There are strong grounds
for believing that one of the most impelling motives to secession was
the desire of the slaveholding class to shake off the external threats
against slavery in order to be better able to cope with internal dangers.
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The General Effects of Slavery upon
Southern Economic Progress
By

ROBERT R. RUSSEL

Reprinted from The Journal of Southern History,
IV (February 1938), 34-54.

M

ANY WRITERS have made sweeping generalizations as to the
effects, allegedly injurious, of Negro slavery upon the economic
progress of the South. It is believed that many time-honored generali
zations about the subject are incorrect. The economics of slavery as
expounded by the abolitionists, especially the English economist, J. E.
Cairnes, 1 seemed to triumph on the battlefield. Such views have sub
sequently been accepted too implicitly not only in the North but even
in the South.2 It is proposed to examine anew several widely-accepted
generalizations.
Slavery is still being blamed for the wasteful and unscientific
methods of farming practiced in the South before the Civil War. The
authors of two popular college textbooks in the economic history of
the United States both quote a table of statistics found in Ezra C.
Seaman's Essays on the Progress of Nations, published in 1868, which

I J. E. Cairnes, The Slave Power: Its Character, Career, and Probable De
signs (New York, 1862).
2 The writer's quarrel is principally with general histories and history text
books, especially economic texts. Of the latter, Edward C. Kirkland, A History
of American Economic Life (New York, 1 932), is excepted, although it is be
lieved that some of his conclusions require modification. Among the more
detailed accounts which have greatly influenced recent textbooks are M. B.
Hammond, The Cotton Industry: An Essay in American Economic History
(New York, 1 897), which is very critical of slavery, and the various works
of Ulrich B. Phillips, especially American Negro Slavery (New York, 1 9 1 8), and
Life and Labor in the Old South (Boston, 1 929). Those familiar with these
works will readily recognize the differences between the conclusions reached
in this article and the conclusions of the scholars named. The writer has great
respect for the treatment of slavery in Lewis C. Gray, History of Agriculture in
the Southern United States to 1860, 2 vols. (Washington, 1933), and agrees
with most of it, but cannot accept his interpretation of several important
matters.
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compares the "free" and the "slave" states in respect to number of
acres of improved and unimproved land in farms in 1860 and the
total value and the average value per acre of farm lands. The com
parison shows inferiority of the slave states in all respects; and the
writers leave the impression that slavery was the cause. 3 One author
says:
A second condition which made slavery possible and profitable was an
abundance of new land... If land anywhere became scare and dear,
slavery tended to disappear. Intensive and scientific methods of farm
ing were seldom possible under the indifferent and wasteful slave
system. Consequently, the colonial method was persisted in, of cropping
a tract of land until it was exhausted and then moving on to a fresh
piece.4
As a matter of fact, "skinning" the soil was practiced in all sections
of the country. It was as common in most districts of the North as it
was in the South. It was at least as common in the small-farm belts
of the South as in the plantation districts. The preponderant reason
was the same everywhere, namely, the cheapness of land. It was
cheaper to acquire and clear a new farm of virgin soil than it was to
restore, or even maintain, the fertility of the old. Contributory reasons
were inertness and ignorance; but the want of initiative and knowl
edge was not as great among planters as among small farmers. The
best farming in the South was done by planters, 5 many of whom took
keen interest in agricultural reform and experimental methods6 and
farmed in an intensive manner. 7 In general, however, before the Civil
War, it was only in the vicinity of cities where land became dear by
reason of its demand for special purposes such as dairying and truck
gardening, that much attention was given to manuring, fertilizing, and
crop rotation. Speaking by and large, Southern soils-except rich
bottom lands-wore out more rapidly than Northern. Cotton did not
3 Ernest L. Bogart, Economic History of the American People (New York,
19 3 5), 456; Harold U. Faulkner, American Economic History (New York,
193 5 ), 391.
4 Bogart, Economic History of the American People, 455.
5 Avery 0. Craven, Soil Exhaustion as a Factor in the Agricultural History
of Virginia and Maryland, 1606-1860, in University of Illinois Studies in the
Social Sciences, XIII, No. 1 (Urbana, 1925), 86-91, and passim. W. H. Russell
told of a great sugar plantation which was "better tilled than the finest patch
in all the Lothians." My Diary North and South (New York, 1863), 10 3.
6 Craven, Soil Exhaustion, 86-121, 124-44; id., "The Agricultural Reform
ers of the Ante-Bellum South," in American Historical Review (New York,
1895- ), XXXIII (1926), 3 02-14; Gray, History of Agriculture in the South
ern United States, II, 7 79-92.
7 Gray, History of Agriculture in the Southern United States, I, 447, 449.
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exhaust the soil as rapidly as grain crops; tobacco was hard on the soil. 8
But the land is nearly everywhere rolling or hilly, the soil is generally
lighter than in the North, the greater part of the section lacks good
native grasses, which would check erosion on lands retired from culti
vation, and there are more heavy, dashing rains. Consequently there
was much more soil erosion in the South.9
There was nothing inherent in slavery that prevented the adoption
of more scientific methods of agriculture. ID A planter could direct his
slaves to spread manure, cotton seed, or marl, to plow horizontally on
the hillsides, to avoid shallow tillage, and to pile brush in incipient
gullies. The small farmer might do such things himself, but he was less
likely to do them than the planter was to have them done.
Slavery may have retarded the adoption of improved agricultural
machinery. At any rate, the proposition is true that employers will
hesitate to entrust expensive and complicated machinery to careless,
irresponsible, and incompetent workmen. On the other hand, large
farmers, other things being equal, are abler and more likely to adopt
improved machinery than small farmers. The small farmers of the
South certainly made no better record in this regard than the planters.
Cotton growers were not slow to adopt the cotton gin, one of the most
revolutionary pieces of agricultural machinery in our history. Sugar
making machinery was complicated and expensive. Southern planters
adopted the various improvements in the plow as the improved plows
could be had. They rapidly substituted horses and mules for the slow
moving oxen when they were found to be better adapted to their pur-

8 Hammond, Cotton Industry, 45, 79; Eugene W. Hilgard, Report on the
Geology and Agriculture of the State of Mississippi (Jackson, 1 860), 242;
Craven, Soil Exhaustion, 32-33.

9 R. 0. E. Davis, Soil Erosion in the South (United States Department of
Agriculture, Bulletin No. 180 [Washington, 1915]), 8, 17-20; Craven, Soil Ex
haustion, 27-39, 162.
10 Cf. Craven, Soil Exhaustion, 162-64; and Gray, History of Agriculture
in the Southern United States, I, 445-48; II, 940. Rosser H. Taylor, Slavehold
ing in North Carolina: An Economic View (Chapel Hill, 1926), 43, believes
that slavery may have contributed to the clearing of new fields instead of im
proving old ones "as it was convenient to employ slaves in winter in clearing
new fields." Phillips (ed.) Plantation and Frontier, 1649-1863, Vols. I and II
in John R. Commons (ed.), A Documentary History of American Industrial
Society, 10 vols. (Cleveland, 1910), I, 93, states that in the piedmont region
the frequent need of clearing new fields disturbed the plantation routine and
enabled small planters to hold their own against large. Taylor, Slaveholding in
North Carolina, 81, states that the practice of paying overseers by allowing
them a share of the crop "was criticized on the ground that it was rapidly
producing deterioration of the soil." Craven, Soil Exhaustion, 38, believes the
criticism valid, and so does Gray, History of Agriculture in the Southern Unit
ed States, I, 448.
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poses. In fact, the ox was displaced more slowly in New England than
in other sections of the country, including the South. 1 1
There is only a modicum of truth in the assertion, which still finds
its way into print, that slavery inspired a contempt for physical labor
among the white people of the South, and thereby rendered the section
a great economic disservice. Slavery, or the presence of Negroes, which
was the result of slavery, may properly be credited with responsibility
for the idea universally prevalent in districts with considerable black
population that whites must not perform menial services, that is, such
personal services for others as cooking, washing, scrubbing, and at
tendance as maids or valets.12 Originally, perhaps, whites shunned
the performance of such services simply because of their menial
character. Because whites shunned them, they were the more readily
assigned to Negroes; and the more the blacks were thus employed, the
more odious to whites such tasks became. But, although slavery may
have excluded whites from menial services, it does not follow that
whites were deprived of productive employment on that account.
Slavery and Negroes may also have bred the idea in slaveholding
regions that people who could afford to own or hire servants should not
perform their own domestic tasks, much as generations of low wages
for household servants in England have established the idea that no
woman of the middle class or above may do her own housework, at
least not without a servant or two about for the sake of appearances.
It was indeed true that families in slaveholding regions began to
employ domestic servants at a lower income level than was the case
in nonslaveholding districts. In so far as slavery was responsible for this,
the institution rendered the South an economic disservice to the extent
that it caused a greater degree of idleness than existed among similiar
classes in other sections-provided that such leisure is not to be con
sidered economically desirable. But it should not be overlooked, in this
11 Perhaps the principal reason for delaying substitution in various locali
ties was the lack of sufficient grain for feed, without which horses and mules
could not do much hard work. There were other reasons for delay, however.
See Percy W. Bidwell and J. L. Falconer, History of Agriculture in the Northern
United States, 1620-1860 (Washington, 1 925), 111-13, 243, 403-405; Gray,
History of Agriculture in the Southern United States, II, 851-52.
12 The line was often finely and strangely drawn. A Virginia farmer told
Frederick L. Olmsted that he did not know that white farm laborers were par
ticular about working with Negroes, but no white man would ever do certain
kinds of work, such as taking care of cattle or getting water or wood for use
in the house. If one should ask a white man to do such work, he would get
mad and reply that he was no "nigger." Poor white girls never hired out to do
servants' work, but they would help another white woman with her sewing and
quilting and take wages for it. There were some "very respectable ladies" that
would go out to sew. The Cotton Kingdom, 2 vols. (New York, 1861), I, 82.
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connection, that mistresses on all but the largest plantations had heavy
responsibilities in supervising servants in various household manufac
tures, in looking after the sick, in teaching the children, and in many
other concerns.
There was no stigma attached in the South in slavery days to the
performance of manual labor, as distinguished from menial, or of any
other sort of labor not considered menial.13 There were situations,
however, in which whites would not work with slaves, just as now there
are situations in which whites will not work with Negroes. White wage
earners, except perhaps immigrants who had not yet learned to draw
the line, would not labor on a plantation under an overseer. They
would, however, work with slaves if there was some evident distinction
in tasks or status. A white farmer and his sons had no repugnance to
working along with their own or hired slaves at any task required on
the farm. White hired men, too, would work with the farmer and
slaves. A farmer's wife and daughters might not work in the fields with
slaves, but the women folk of nonslaveholding whites were about as
likely to work in the fields as were Northern women similarly circum
stanced. In both sections, as in England, women were withdrawn from
the fields as standards of living rose. An overseer on a plantation was
not supposed to do physical labor, even if so inclined; to do so, it was
thought, and no doubt correctly, would be detrimental to discipline. A
foreman who had charge of a small group of slaves on a farm or a
small plantation-and there were many such-was expected to work
along with the slaves. A large planter and his sons might not engage
in physical labor; to do so would lower them in the esteem of their
neighbors and slaves. It is difficult to say whether slavery was respon
sible for this pleasing fancy or only made it more possible to humor it.
English country gentlemen and their sons likewise eschewed manual
labor, and Northern millowners did not as a rule send their sons into
the mills as hands. Furthermore, even planters who employed overseers
usually had their time well-occupied with the management of their
plantations, and their management was economically more productive
than wielding the plow or hoe would have been.
The same situation obtained in the cities and towns of the South. In
factories, mills, and shops, and about the wharves, white laborers, free
Negroes, and slaves, sometimes of both sexes, worked side by side,
usually, but not always, with some distinction of tasks. Frequently the

13 In the South considerable point was made of this distinction between
menial and manual labor. In the North the word menial was not so commonly
used, either as adjective or noun.
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whites objected to working with Negroes and sought to have them
excluded from certain employments, but never successfully. The oppo
sition arose partly from race prejudice and partly from dislike of Negro
competition. In the North, where Negro laborers were relatively few,
the opposition of whites to Negro competition was more effective. It
would seem unlikely that many whites were deprived of useful employ
ment by their disinclination to work with Negroes or to labor at certain
tasks commonly performed by slaves.14
Southern people in general were more inclined than those in the
East and Northwest to dislike physical labor, especially heavy physical
labor, and to seek "white-collar" jobs or to live by their wits. The evi
dence on this point is overwhelming. But it does not follow that slavery
was the cause of this difference. A similar variance in other places and
in other times has commonly been explained by differences in temper
ature, humidity, ease of making a living, eating and drinking habits,
general health, cultural antecedents, and social organizations. 15 If
such explanations are valid for other places and other times, they are
equally valid for the United States in slavery times.
A more difficult question with regard to the general economic
effects of slavery is whether or not the institution retarded the growth
of population of the slaveholding states. If so, it was a grievous fault;
for economic history shows that increase in population in a region has
been conducive to the development of improved means of transporta
tion, the commercialization of agriculture and manufactures, and the
extension of the factory system-developments which, with all their
evils, have contributed to economic progress.
At the close of the colonial period the six commonwealths which
continued to permit slavery and to colonize new "slave" territory, that
is, Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, the two Carolinas, and Georgia,
together with Louisiana, Florida, and Texas, had a slightly greater

14 The last four paragraphs are based upon numerous but widely scattered
scraps of evidence gleaned from a variety of sources, especially De Bow's Re
view (New Orleans, 1846-1880); the various works of Olmsted dealing with
the South; and Phillips (ed.), Plantation and Frontier, I, II. Considerable
evidence is presented in an uncritical manner in Charles H. Wesley, Negro La

bor in the United States, 1850-1925: A Study in American Economic History

(New York, 1927), Chap. III. Particular statements made above are confirmed
by Kathleen Bruce, Virginia Iron Manufacture in the Slave Era (New York,
1930), Chap. VI; Ivan E. McDougle, "Slavery in Kentucky, 1792-1865," in
Journal of Negro History (Lancaster, Pa., 1932- ), III (1934), 296; Alfred H.
Stone, "Free Contract Labor in the Ante-Bellum South," in The South in the
Building of the Nation, 1 2 vols. (Richmond, 1909), V, 142.
15 The influence of such factors in the case of the poor whites is well des
cribed by Paul H. Buck, "The Poor Whites in the Ante-Bellum South," in
American Historical Review, XXXI (1925 ), 41-55.
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population than the seven states to the north which shortly became
"free." In 1860 there were eighteen free and fifteen slave states. Ac
cording to the census for that year the former had a population of
18,800,527, the latter, 12,315,374. Wherein lies the explanation? We
can not now detect any differences in the birth and death rates of the
two sections.
For one thing, the number of people of Southern birth who
migrated to the North was much greater than the number of people of
Northern birth who moved to the South. In 1850 there were 608,626
people of Southern birth living in free states and only 199,672 people
born in free states residing in the South. The corresponding numbers
for 1860 were 713,527 and 371,421.16 In 1860 there were, by careful
estimate, about 800,000 more people of Southern birth and parentage
living in free territory than there were people of Northern stock living
in slaveholding regions. This accounts, then, for approximately 1,600,000 of the 6,500,000 disparity in population between sections.
This large net loss to the South in intersectional migration, in turn,
is to be explained almost wholly by the circumstances of the westward
movement of population during the period and the various conditions
and political maneuvers that determined which of the new states
beyond the mountains should be free and which slave. The old story of
thousands of small farmers from the South fleeing across the Ohio
River to escape slavery is almost pure fiction.17 People from the older
states moved west with various motives, the principal one being the
acquisition of land. They usually followed the most available routes.
Before the railroads were built, great numbers of people from Virginia
and Maryland went up the Potomac Valley, crossed over to the Ohio
River, using the Cumberland National Road after it had been built,
floated down the Ohio, and eventually found homes in Kentucky and
the southern parts of Ohio, Indiana, and Illinois, or beyond the Missis
sippi in Missouri, Arkansas, and Iowa. Many other people from Mary
land, Virginia, and North Carolina crossed the Blue Ridge by various
routes, picked up the trail in the Great Valley, and followed it down
into Tennessee or turned off and went through Cumberland Gap into
Kentucky. Thousands of Kentuckians and Tennesseeans in turn, of the
first, second, or later generations, moved on west or northwest into
southern Indiana, southern Illinois, Missouri, Arkansas, and, in less

16 Compendium of the Seventh Census of the United States, 1850, pp. 116
ff.; Eighth Census of the United States, 1860, Population, 616 ff. The District
of Columbia is included with the South.
17

Taylor, Slaveholding in North Carolina, 56-58.
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numbers, into Iowa and southwestern Wisconsin. Only slaveholders
who wished to take their slaves with them were debarred from choosing
a location north of the Ohio; scores of slaveholders, in fact, did take
their slaves into Indiana and Illinois under life or other long-term
indentures permitted by the early laws.18 Of the 608,626 natives of the
South living in 1850 in free states, 505,096 resided in the four states of
Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, and Iowa, and of the latter number 462,088
had been born in Virginia, Maryland, North Carolina, Kentucky, and
Tennessee. The corresponding numbers for 1860 were 713,527, 530,843,
and 481,322 respectively.
Many thousands of people from Pennsylvania and, to a less extent,
from New York and New Jersey, crossed to the Ohio River, floated
down that stream, and eventually settled on the left bank in Kentucky
or crossed the Mississippi into Missouri. Other thousands settled first
on the right bank of the Ohio, and then later, they or their children
moved on into Kentucky or, especially, Missouri. Of the 371,421 people
born in free states but living in 1860 in slave states, 208,059 were to be
found in Missouri and Kentucky. Northerners certainly did not shun
Missouri. In 1860 there were 166,620 people living there who had been
born on free soil and 274,572 who had been born in other slave states.
There was also a large interchange of population across the line be
tween Pennsylvania and New Jersey on the one side and Virginia,
Maryland, and Delaware on the other; 49,827 people born north of the
line were living south of it in 1860, and 50,958 born south of it were
living on the other side. There was much less exchange of population
between New England and the Great Lakes region on the one hand and
the Lower South on the other. But such exchange did occur. Thousands
of Yankees undeterred by slavery went south to farm, work in mills,
run steamboats, buy cotton, sell merchandise, teach school, and fill all
manner of other jobs which became available. There were many more
Northerners scattered about the Lower South than there were people
from the latter region residing in the Upper North. In 1860 there were
12,549 natives of New England living in the seven cotton states and
only 2,169 people from the cotton states to be found in New England.
The other important cause of the disparity of population between
the North and the South in 1860 was the fact that the former had re
ceived much the greater share of the foreign immigration. In 1860 there
were 3,582,999 people of foreign birth living in free states and the

18 John B. McMaster, A History of the People of the United States from
the Revolution to the Civil War, 8 vols. (New York, 1883-1913), III, 526-28;

V, 187.
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territories and only 553,176 in the slave states. In 1850 the numbers
had been 1,900,325 and 310,514. Why did not the slave states get a
larger share of the immigrants? The blame has often been unjustly
placed upon slavery.
Most of the immigrants in ante-bellum days, as since, landed at
New York City, for that was the principal terminus of the trans
Atlantic packet lines and, after their advent, the steamship lines. Many
remained in New York; the majority scattered to various parts of the
country. Most numerous among the immigrants after 1845 (about the
time the tide of immigration set in strongly) were the Irish. They were
poor and sought work for wages. They found it chiefly in the cities and
factory towns and in railroad and canal construction. The cities and
mill towns were mainly in the East, and the railroads and canals were
being built mostly there and in the Northwest. A considerable number
of Irishmen found work building Southern railroads and many were
emp!oyed at the wharves of New Orleans and other Southern towns.
They showed no great prejudice against slavery or against Negroes.
Next most numerous among immigrants were Germans. They
usually had more means than the Irish, and a larger proportion of them
went to the growing Northwest, acquired land, and grew grain and
raised livestock. They undoubtedly disliked slavery. But they would
have preferred the Northwest even if slavery had not been in the pic
ture. There they could get excellent land at the minimum government
price located in districts which were being rapidly opened to markets
by the building of railroads. They could practice a type of farming
more like that of the old country. And acclimation was less difficult
than in the South. Thousands of Germans went to the quasi-slave state
of Missouri where land and farming were quite like those of states of
the Northwest. And a considerable number were lured to the rich,
cheap lands of Texas to grow cotton and grain.19 Few of them acquired
slaves, partly because they disliked slavery and partly because they
could not afford to purchase them.
It would seem, then, to be a safe conclusion that neither slavery nor
the presence of Negroes was in any direct sense responsible for the
failure of the slaveholding states as a whole to grow as rapidly in
population as the free states as a whole between 1790 and 1860. No
doubt thousands of individuals were deterred from going South by race
prejudice, dislike of slavery, or a disinclination to compete with slaves
for jobs. But, since so many others were undeterred by such motives

19 Albert B. Faust, The German Element in the United States, 2 vols. (Bos
ton, 1909), I, 490-501; Olmsted, Cotton Kingdom, II, 96, 262-66.
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and considerations, it is reasonable to suppose that, if economic oppor
tunities had been great enough, people would have come in greater
numbers from the North and from Europe to seize upon them. 20
This conclusion is further justified by events which have occurred
since slavery was abolished. The percentage of immigrants locating in
the South has been even less than it was in slavery days. For example,
in 1890 only 8.3 per cent of the foreign born of this country lived in the
South whereas 13.4 per cent had lived there in 1860. Now it is possible
that it has been the presence of the Negro, a resultant of slavery, which
has repelled. But it is highly probable that it has been the comparative
lack of economic opportunities in the South, still suffering from the
ravages of war for much of the period. 2 1 Many whites and blacks have
gone North to get jobs, especially during the great boom prior to 1929.
Moreover, the presence of Negroes has not kept Northerners out of
particular localities or particular occupations in the South where
oppotunities have called.
The conclusion just stated brings up another question which has
caused historians much trouble, namely, to what extent, if at all, was
slavery responsible for the comparative dearth of economic opportuni
ties in the South which, in turn, kept the population from growing more
rapidly? In agriculture slavery reduced opportunities somewhat for
nonslaveholding whites but not for the population as a whole. Because
of it the white farm population was probably less than it would other
wise have been, but the total farm population was greater. And, be it
noted, when writers say that slavery retarded the growth of the popula
tion of the South, they mean total population, not white population
only.
The story is briefly this: The staple crops of the South gave the
incentive for men of enterprise to engage in large-scale agriculture.
Land was plentiful and cheap. The labor problem was more difficult.
People of good-enough quality would not work for low-enough wages,
in large-enough numbers, and with sufficient regularity in a country
where it was so easy to get land and farm independently. The solution
was first found in indentured servants, and the earliest plantations
were developed with that class of labor. As time passed Negro slaves
were preferred, great numbers were imported, they throve and multi
plied, and many farmers developed into planters.2 2
20
Cf. Emory Q. Hawk, Economic History of the South (New York, 1934),
2 2 0- 2 1.
21 Gray, History of Agriculture in the Southern United States, II, 940.
22

The subject of this paragraph has been amplified and more thoroughly
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Although a time did not arrive when more than about one third of
the agricultural population of the South, including the Negroes, lived
on plantations as distinguished from small farms, 2 3 the great bulk of
the staple crops came to be produced on plantations-all the sugar and
rice, most of the tobacco, and at least three fourths of the cotton. There
were several reasons for this. 2 4 In the production of sugar and rice,
which required considerable capital, small farmers could not compete
with planters and were crowded out. The competitive advantages of the
plantation in the growing of cotton and tobacco were not so great, if,
indeed, there were any. But planters held slaves for the primary purpose
of producing staples for market; they would not have kept slaves had it
not been for this motive. Small farmers, on the contrary, were under no
particular urge to engage in commercialized agriculture. They might
make a better living by doing general or subsistence farming. Slaves
were better adapted to the routine of the plantation than they were to
the more varied tasks of general farming with considerable household
manufacturing. Also, as a class, the planters were more enterprising
and they were better managers than the small farmers; the more
ambitious and capable of the small farmers were likely to graduate into
the planter class. So planters got the better lands, near enough to
transportation facilities to justify staple agriculture, while small farmers
had cheaper, but not necessarily poorer, lands more remote from the
routes of commerce and followed a more self-sufficing economy or, if
they remained in the plantation belts, lived on the poorer lands and
practiced a more general agriculture than their planter neighbors.
If slavery had not existed in the South and, consequently, there had
been few or no plantations, it is reasonable to presume that the lands
which were in fact in plantations would have been held by the more
capable small farmers, who would have raised staples although in some
what smaller quantities than they were actually produced. In this case
the white farm population of the South would have been greater than
it actually was, but not as great as the actual farm population, both
white and black.
reasoned in Robert R. Russel, "The Economic History of Negro Slavery in the
United States," in Agricultural History (Chicago, Baltimore, 1927- ) , XI
(1937), 308-21.
23 The percentage depends upon where the line is drawn between the plan
tation and the farm. If the minimum number of slaves on a plantation be
arbitrarily set at ten, about 30 per cent of the farm population resided on
plantations in 1850. Cf. Gray, History of Agriculture in the Southern United
States, I, 482, 529.
24 These reasons are developed at greater length in an unpublished paper
by the writer on "The Effects of Slavery upon Non-Slaveholders in the Ante
Bellum South."

-46-

But immigrants into the North after 1790 went largely into non
agricultural occupations. To what extent, if at all, was slavery respon
sible for the backwardness of the South in other lines of economic
development than agriculture? Manufacturing may be selected for con
sideration since, next to agriculture, it is the most fundamental industry.
Even in colonial times the Southern commonwealths did less manu
facturing in proportion to population than did the Northern. In the
middle period, as the industrial revolution proceeded, the South did a
smaller and smaller percentage of the nation's manufacturing. In 1860
the capital invested in manufacturing in the South was only 9.5 per cent
of the capital so invested in the entire country; and the number of
hands employed was only 8.4 per cent of the nation's total. Moreover,
nearly one half of Southern manufactures consisted of flour and grist,
lumber, and turpentine, products of simple operations.
A number of reasons may be advanced to account for the industrial
backwardness of the South, few of which have much relevance to
slavery. In colonial times in the tidewater region, the continued and
anticipated profits of staple agriculture, together with the superior
adaptability of slaves thereto, made it unnecessary and unprofitable to
do much household and shop manufacturing. In the Northern colonies
and the back country of the South, the lack of markets for agricultural
products constrained the people to do more manufacturing. A combina
tion of factors-the abundance of white pine, water power near the sea,
the demand for ships and boats for the fisheries and the carrying trade,
markets for lumber in the same regions where the fish were marketed
caused lumbering and shipbuilding to be concentrated largely along the
New England coast. In a similar fashion other special factors caused
various other branches of manufacturing to be more or less concentrat
ed in the North.
When the Industrial Revolution reached the United States, popula
tion was comparatively sparse in the South, distances were great, and
means of transportation poor. The poorer whites afforded little demand
for manufactured goods. Neither did the slaves, but the masters, who
exploited their labor, presumably compensated for them in this regard.
So markets were too dispersed and inadequate to encourage large-scale
manufacturing. The population of the East was more compact and,
therefore, transportation facilities could be provided at lower cost. The
purchasing power of the people was greater.
The streams of the South were less manageable for power than were
those of the East. Southern power sites were relatively inaccessible to
natural avenues of transportation; in New England, especially, con
siderable power was available very near the sea.
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The principal Southern raw material, cotton, was not at all bulky
and would stand transportation to distant markets. The humid atmos
phere of the New England seaboard was advantageous to cotton mills.
For lumbering the North possessed much the same advantages over the
South in the middle period that it had possessed in the colonial. Even
before coal came to be used in smelting, parts of Pennsylvania had an
advantage over other regions of the country in ironmaking by reason of
the juxtaposition of wood, ore, and limestone in localities near naviga
ble rivers or other means of transportation. When coal superseded
charcoal the advantage of Pennsylvania was enhanced. To illustrate, in
the days of charcoal furnaces a considerable secondary iron industry
was developed in Richmond, Virginia, which used pig iron smelted in
the back country and brought down the James River. After smelting
with anthracite was well developed in eastern Pennsylvania, about
1850, the Richmond iron works procured their pig iron there and the
back country furnaces died out.25 The principal iron ore field of the
South, near present Birmingham, Alabama, was in ante-bellum days all
but inaccessible. The Pittsburgh field, by way of contrast, lay at the
head of a magnificent system of inland waterways transportation. After
railroads penetrated northern Georgia, northern Alabama, and eastern
Tennessee, during the fifties, numbers of small furnaces and foundries
sprang up, but they could not compete with those of Pennsylvania ex
cept in the local markets.
In the East, where there had been more household and shop
industry, and much manufacturing done under the "putting out"
system, there were more laborers to be diverted to mills and factories
when they came in. The opening of improved means of communication
with the fine farming regions of western New York and the Northwest
brought destructive competition to Eastern agriculture, released still
more men, women, and children to become mill hands, and supplied
them with food and raw materials. In the South the continued profit
ableness of staple agriculture prevented slaveowners from turning to
manufacturing or diverting their slaves thereto. Although slaves were
frequently used successfully in mills, factories, and shops, in fact in
practically every mechanical pursuit, they were certainly not as well
adapted to mechanical employments as to agriculture.26 It was difficult
Bruce, Virginia Iron Manufacture in the Slave Era, 275-78.
26 There was much discussion of this point in the South about 1845-1852.
The concensus was about as stated here. Ibid., Chap. VI; Wesley, Negro Labor
in the United States, Ch. I; Phillips, American Negro Slavery, 375-78; Robert
R. Russel, Economic Aspects of Southern Sectionalism, 1840-1861, University
of Illinois Studies in the Social Sciences, XI, No. 1, Pts. I, II ( 1923), 41, 54.
25
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to transform the small, independent, self-sufficing farmers of the South
into urban wage earners.
Capital for industry in the East had come from the profits of
merchandising and shipping as well as from the profits of industry. In
the South there was no considerable source of capital outside manu
facturing itself. The profits of agriculture, such as they were, were
absorbed in expanding agriculture and providing facilities for trans
portation. If the section had offered exceptional opportunities, capital
and labor would have been diverted from agriculture or would have
flowed in from the outside, but such was not the case. Once the
North had gained a good start upon the South in manufacturing, it
became harder for the latter to make progress. For then infant in
dustries in the South would have to get started in the face of unre
stricted competition from firmly established industries in the North. 27
Of the various reasons enumerated for the backwardness of the
South in manufacturing, only one relates directly to slavery, namely,
slave labor was not so well adapted to manufacturing as to agriculture,
and, therefore, other things being equal, slaveowners preferred to keep
their slaves engaged in the latter. A second reason for which slavery has
frequently been blamed may relate indirectly to the institution, namely,
a dearth of capital for investment. It becomes necessary, therefore, to
ascertain what effects, if any, slavery had upon saving and investment
in the South.
Slavery, as we have seen, made possible the development of large
scale farming. By all the rules of economic history the planters should
have saved much for investment in further productive enterprises; it is
the people with the larger incomes who do most of the saving for
investment. The planters did save. They saved more than their small
farmer neighbors did. They saved enough to keep expanding their
agricultural operations. They provided much of the capital for internal
improvements and other productive undertakings. But the fact remains
that they did not save as much for investment as might logically be
expected of them.
Many of the planters, especially those of old families, did not have
steady habits and frugal instincts. They often had visions of grandeur
inherited from spacious colonial days and reinforced by real or fancied

2 7 The reasons for the backwardness of the South in manufacturing are
described in greater detail in Victor S. Clark, "Manufactures," in The South
in the Building of the Nation, V, 299-335; Russel, Economic Aspects of South
ern Sectionalism, 54-64; Gray, History of Agriculture in the Southern United
States, II, 931-36.
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descent from English aristocracy. 28 At any rate, planters who were
making money, and often those who were losing it,29 lived well. They
built big houses. Their habitations were literally overrun by domestic
servants. They bought luxuries. Those with the largest incomes
frequently spent their substance at Northern watering places or in
European travel. How slavery could have been responsible for these
enlarged views it is impossible to see, except, of course, that it was
slavery that made it possible to indulge them.
Again planters' savings were diminished by the almost universal
practice of living and operating not upon the income from the preced
ing crop but upon the anticipated income from the next crop; that is,
they lived largely upon advances received from their factors upon con
templated or growing crops as security. These advances cost dearly.
They cost not only interest but also the reduced prices which they
occasioned, for the markets were frequently glutted and prices depress
ed because so many planters were under the necessity of selling their
crops as soon as harvested in order to pay their debts. This practice of
obtaining advances upon anticipated crops would not have prevented, it
might even have facilitated, the accumulation of capital in the South,
if the advances had been made by Southern men. But they were not.
They were made in last analysis by Northern or British firms. 30 Even if
the planter eschewed advances from his cotton factor, the result was
much the same, for in that case he bought supplies on long credit from
his merchant who in turn had bought them on long credit from North
ern jobbers or wholesalers. It would be difficult to name anything more
efficacious in preventing the accumulation of capital than eight, ten, or
fifteen per cent interest, often compounded.
This system of advances was caused partly by the lack of habits of
thrift, already bemoaned. Its principal cause w_as the speculative char
acter of a commercialized agriculture with distant markets. A farmer
who produces for market is always under strong temptation to borrow
money, get more land and hands, and put out a larger acreage, because
there is always the possibility of raising a bumper crop and selling it at
top prices. Nature is not consistent. There is always the prospect in any
community of having a big crop while there is a total or partial failure
28 Thomas J. Wertenbaker has thoroughly discredited the old idea that
Virginia was largely settled by cavaliers. Patrician and Plebeian in Virginia, or
the Origin and Development of Colonial Virginia (Princeton, 192 2).
29 Taylor, Slaveholding in North Carolina, 95-96.

30 Alfred H. Stone, "The Cotton Factorage System of the Southern States,"
in American Historical Review, XX (1915), 557-65; Hammond, Cotton Indus
try, 108 ff; Russel, Economic Aspects of Southern Sectionalism, 100-10 7.
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elsewhere, with consequent high prices and big income for those who
dwell in the favored community. Farmers gamble on the big year. 3 1
Such speculation has by no means been confined to slaveowners and
cotton growers. It has been as evident in nonslaveholding regions as in
slaveholding-the wheat belt for instance. Slavery only made it possible
for some farmers to gamble on a bigger scale.
Another thing, closely related to the factor just mentioned, which
militated against the accumulation of capital in the South was the occa
sional overproduction of the staples. Within a few decades after the
invention of the gin, the cotton states were producing over three fourths
of the cotton sold in the world's markets. A big crop in the South sent
the price down, a small crop sent it up. It happened more than once
that a smaller crop of cotton at a high price brought in a larger aggre
gate amount to the growers than a large crop at a low price. But con
stant pleas to grow less cotton and more corn fell on deaf ears. In the
cases of tobacco, sugar, and rice, the American crop was such a small
part of the world's total that its quantity had comparatively little effect
on world prices, and, therefore, there could be overproduction in the
South, considered alone, only in the sense that labor and capital might
more profitably have been directed into other channels. A chief reason
for the overproduction of staples, when it occurred, was the speculative
character of commercialized agriculture just noted. Slavery did not sup
ply the urge to speculate, but it made speculation possible on a larger
scale and thus contributed to overproduction. In general, of course, it
was to the advantage of the South to produce great crops of cotton and
other staples. Occasional overproduction was preferable to consistent
underproduction. And without slavery there probably would have been
consistent underproduction during the period under consideration.
It has frequently been stated that slavery "absorbed" capital in the
South which otherwise might have been used in productive enter
prises. 32 Such a statement needs much qualification if it is not to be
misleading. While foreign slave trade lasted, part of the profits of
Southern industry went to Yankee skippers, English lords, Dahomey
chiefs, etc., in exchange for slaves. Thus capital which might have
been used to build sawmills or ships or for other productive purposes in
the South was "fixed" in the form of slaves. Capital could not be taken
out of the South by the internal or domestic slave trade, however. To

Cf. Hammond, Cotton Industry, 109; Olmsted, Cotton Kingdom, II, 49.
32 For example, Phillips seems to have said this. American Negro Slavery,
3 95-99; id., "The Economic Cost of Slaveholding in the Cotton Belt," in Poli
tical Science Quarterly (New York, 1886- ), XX (1905), 271-75.
31
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illustrate, suppose Mississippi cotton planters, out of the profits of the
industry, bought Virginia slaves. The slaves would still be in the South
and presumably capable of paying for themselves and providing a
reasonable profit on the investment. The saving of the planters would
still be in the South also, although in Virginia instead of Mississippi,
and, persumably, could be invested in factories, railroads, and other
productive enterprises. They in tum might attract labor from the North
or from Europe. Suppose, however, the Mississippi planters were able to
hire free-born Virginians to come down and work the plantations and,
instead of buying slaves, invested their savings in sawmills in their own
state, employing workers attracted from the North or from Europe to
operate the sawmills. The South as a whole would lose no laborers and
no savings in this case, but Virginia would have been to the trouble
and expense of rearing workers until they had reached maturity only to
see them go away to contribute to the prosperity of another state. Thus
slavery did not absorb Southern capital in any direct sense; it affected
the distribution of capital within the section. The mere capitalization
of the anticipated labor of a particular class did not destroy or diminish
any other kind of property. 33
But in an indirect way slavery may have had the effect of absorbing
capital nevertheless. Take the case of the Virginia tobacco planters and
the Mississippi cotton planters again. The Virginians probably received
considerably more for their slaves than they had invested in rearing
them, for the supply of slaves was not adjusted to demand and prices
were normally considerably in excess of costs of production. And prob
ably, instead of investing their profits in productive enterprises, the
Virginians used them for living expenses, not having produced enough
on their worn-out tobacco plantations to maintain their accustomed
style of living. Thus as a consequence of slavery the profitable cotton
industry of Mississippi might be carrying along the incubus of an
unprofitable tobacco industry in Virginia or at least enabling tobacco
planters there to live in a style not justified by their earned incomes.34
Under a free-labor system this would hardly have been possible. But,
on the other hand, if it had not been for slavery, cotton growers of
Mississippi might not have had any savings to invest.

33 Gray, History of Agriculture in the Southern United States, I, 460, has
put this point very clearly.
34 For similar views of contemporaries of slavery, see Frederick L. Olmsted,
A Journey in the Back Country (New York, 1861), 325; Cairnes, S/.ave Power,
72-76. See, also, Taylor, Slaveholding in North Carolina, 66. Edmund Ruffin
of Virginia, another contemporary, held a contrary view. See "The Effects of
High Prices on Slaves," in De Bow's Review, XXVI (1859), 647-57.
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In conclusion, the importance of Negro slavery as a factor determin
ing the character and extent of the economic development of the South
has been greatly overestimated. It brought a racial element into the
population which would not otherwise have been represented in any
considerable numbers. The importation of slaves and the increase of
the Negro population gave the South a larger total population, at any
date, than it otherwise would have had, but no doubt retarded the
growth of the white population. Slavery made possible the widespread
development of the plantation system of farming and, thereby, gave a
great impetus to the growing of the various Southern staples. This was
beneficial to the South on the whole, although there was occasional
overproduction, to which slavery contributed. Slavery may have retard
ed the diversification of Southern industry. It was conducive to the
accumulation of capital on the whole, although it had the serious
disadvantage of permitting more productive districts to contribute to
the livelihood of the people of less productive regions. But compared
with such great economic factors as climate, topography, natural
resources, location with respect to the North and to Europe, means of
transportation, and character of the white population, Negro slavery
was of lesser consequence in determining the general course of Southern
economic development.
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ER.HAPS no interpretation of the economic history of American
Negro slavery is more generally accepted today than that the insti
tution was detrimental to the nonslaveholding whites of the South.
There have been frequent expressions of the view that the master class
knew its own interest. Occasional admissions of doubt that emancipa
tion conferred economic benefits upon the typical Negro are encount
ered, but it would be difficult to find any divergence from the opinion
that the peculiar institution was a curse to the nonslaveholding whites.
The fact that the latter did not become abolitionists is usually attribut
ed to ignorance of their own interests, domination by the slaveholders,
racial prejudice, or fond expectations of rising into the master class. I
It is the purpose of this article to attempt to show that the commonly
accepted interpretation requires great qualification to bring it into
accord with the truth.
In 1860 approximately one-fourth of the white families of the
South were slaveholding and three-fourths nonslaveholding; and of the
slaveholding families a great many had only one or two slaves each. In
earlier years of the period, the proportion of slaveholders was slightly
larger.
The slaves and slaveholders were very largely concentrated in
belts-the so-called black belts-which coincided with the areas de
voted to the growing of staples, chiefly cotton, tobacco, sugar and rice. 2
There were also many slaves in the cities and towns in or near the
I See, for example, William E. Dodd, The Cotton Kingdom, 32 (New Ha
ven, 1921).
2 Ulrich B. Phillips, "The Origin and Growth of the Southern Black Belts,"
American Historical Review, 11: 798-816 (July 1906}.
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staple-growing areas. These had been marked out by climate, the char
acter of the soil, and, not least, by accessibility to market. Cotton, for
example, for climatic reasons could not be grown to advantage north
of an irregular line crossing North Carolina, Tennessee, and Arkansas.
South of this line cotton was grown on the better lands which lay with
in reasonable distances of navigable rivers or of railroads. Some of the
best of the present-day cotton lands were not utilized for that crop as
late as 1860, because they were too far from navigable rivers while
railroads had not yet penetrated into their vicinity.3
The great majority of the nonslaveholding whites lived outside
the principal staple-growing districts in what is commonly called back,
up, or hill country, or in mountainous regions. In these areas there
were comparatively few slaves. The people were mostly small farmers
and, because of lack of markets or inaccessibility to them, were engag
ed in a more or less self-sufficing agriculture with much household
manufacturing.
It is difficult to see how people living in the back country could be
injured by slavery in the black belts. Except possibly to a slight extent
and in a most indirect way, it was not slavery which prevented them
from producing staple crops for market; it was inaccessibility. Such
markets as they had for their surplus bacon, lard, mules, whiskey, etc.
were chiefly among the planters or in the towns which served the
staple-producing districts. In so far as it was slavery which caused plant
ers to concentrate on the growing of the great market crops while
purchasing various supplies elsewhere, the institution created markets
for back-country farmers and thus benefited them.
It is said that slavery had driven nonslaveholding whites out of the
black belts and out of staple production and had thus worked them a
great injury; that, had it not been for slavery, more of them would
have lived in the staple-producing regions and raised the great market
crops and would have had a higher standard of living on that account.
This time-honored indictment of the peculiar institution has such
great plausibility that its validity has seldom been questioned. The black
belts were a fact. Even nonslaveholding whites who lived in the staple
growing areas did not produce the staples in quantities proportionate
to their numbers. Virtually all the sugar and rice and the bulk of the
cotton and tobacco were produced by slave labor. In 1850, according
to J. D. B. DeBow, there were about 800,000 slaves engaged in cotton

3 Very illuminating on this point is Charles W. Ramsdell, "The Natural
Limits of Slavery Expansion," Missssippi Valley Historical Review, 16: 151-171
( September 1929).
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growing and only about 100,000 whites, and there is no reason to
doubt the essential accuracy of his estimate.4 Much the greater part
of the cash farm income of the South was received by a comparatively
small number of planters, all of whom employed slave labor, of course.
In the cotton States in 1850, according to William E. Dodd, "A thou
sand families received over $50,000,000 a year, while all the remaining
666,000 families received only about $60,000,000."5 This may also be
accepted as approximately accurate. Yet, in spite of such prima facie
evidence, the contention that slavery drove nonslaveholding whites
out of staple production and thus did them a great injury contains
considerably less than a half truth. Both the extent to which slavery
excluded nonslaveholding whites from commercialized agriculture and
the extent of the injury caused by such exclusion have been greatly
exaggerated.
It is recognized at the outset that the problem involves not only the
question of the comparative effectiveness of Negro slave labor and free
white labor, but also that of the efficiency of the plantation as com
pared with the small farm as a unit of agricultural organization. The
plantations of the ante helium South were operated with slave labor
almost exclusively. Almost all white agricultural workers were employed
on small farms; very few served as wage earners on plantations. More
over, the plantation system could not have existed extensively in the
ante bellum South without slave labor, for the simple reason that,
where land was cheap and plentiful and it was easy to become an in
dependent farmer, free whites would not work for low enough wages,
in large enough numbers, and with a sufficient degree of regularity to
permit large-scale farming. 6 White indentured servitude, with which
the earliest plantations had been started, was an impossibility in the
ante helium period. Therefore, any competitive advantages which the
plantation may have possessed over the small farm as a unit of farm
organization must be accredited to the institution of slavery.

4 J. D. B. De Bow, The Industrial Resources, etc., of the Southern and
Western States, l: 175 (New Orleans, 1852-1853). See also A. N. J. Den Hol
lander, "Tradition of 'Poor Whites'," in William T. Couch, ed., Culture in
the South, 411 (Chapel Hill, 1934).
5 Cotton Kingdom, 24.
6 This point has been developed at greater length in Robert R. Russel, "The
Economic History of Negro Slavery in the United States," Agricultural History,
11: 308-321 (October 1937). Only whites of the poorest quality worked as
farm laborers in the Old South-that is, when they worked at all. Often young
men of a better sort worked for neighbors for hire ( sometimes as overseers) un
til they could accumulate the little capital required to start farming on their
own account. People who worked regularly at trades or other occupations oc-
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In sugar and rice culture the plantation undoubtedly had great
competitive advantages over the small farm.7 Sugar growers who owned
sugar-making machinery had a great advantage over those who did not,
and the machinery was so expensive that only large producers could
afford it. The cost of building levees also was conducive to large-scale
operations. The plantation had similar advantages over the small farm
in rice growing. Since plantations would have been impossible without
slavery, it is proper to conclude that slavery kept small farmers from
growing sugar cane and rice or, at least and more probably, from grow
ing other crops on lands which were actually devoted to sugar and rice.
In the growing of cotton and tobacco, however-and these staples
employed about eight slaves to every one in sugar and rice-it is very
doubtful that the plantation was superior to the small farm as a unit
of agricultural production.8 The planter might buy supplies, sell his
produce, and obtain credit-a very doubtful advantage-on somewhat
better terms than the small farmer. Joseph C. Robert has described the
marketing of tobacco in ante bellum Virginia in great detail. The
buyers were very numerous, widely distributed, and quite competitive.
The planter seems to have had little advantage over the small farmer
in selling his product.9 In a newer community where marketing
facilities were not so well developed, the advantage of the large-scale
farmer in buying and selling may have been considerable. In a district
where the large planters bought and sold through nonresident mer
chants or agents and the small farmers were too few and too poor to
support competitive buyers and retail merchants adequately, the small

casionally worked for farmers at harvest or other special seasons when wages
were temporarily high. Plantations obviously could not be run with such labor.
7

There is a well-reasoned statement of this fact in Edward C. Kirkland, A

History of American Economic Life, 181-182 (New York, 1932). See also Lewis
Cecil Gray, History of Agriculture in the Southern United States to 1860, p.

479-480 (Washington, 1933).

8 U. S. Census Office, Seventh Census, 1850, Statistical View of the United
States. . . Being a Compendium of the Seventh Census . .. , by J. D.B. De
Bow, 178. Cf. Ulrich Bonnell Phillips, American Negro Slavery, 309-330 (New
York, 1918); M. B. Hammond, The Cotton Industry: An Essay in American
Economic History, 98-110 (New York, 1897); Gray, History of Agriculture in
the Southern United States, 478-480; Kirkland, History of American Economic
Life, 182-183; Rosser H. Taylor, Slaveholding in North Carolina: An Economic
View, 81, 86-91 (Chapel Hill, 1926); Frederick L. Olm�ted, A Journey in the
Back Country in the Winter of 1853-4, 1:73, 131,141,167; 2:65-70, 119 (Put

nam's Sons edition, New York, 1907).

9 The Tobacco Kingdom: Plantation, Market, and Factory in Virginia and
North Carolina, 1800-1860 p. 94-117 (Durham, 1938). The facts are given by

Robert. The conclusion has been drawn therefrom by the writer.
-57-

farmers would receive considerably less than the planters for what they
might sell and pay considerably more for what they might buy. 10
The planter was able to effect a division of labor among his hands
that was not possible on a small farm, but the operations and the
machinery required in farming in those days were too simple to per
mit any considerable advantage to be gained from that. In fact the
division of labor on a large plantation tended to become fixed and,
by its inflexibility, may have impaired rather than promoted efficiency.
For example, there would have been a moral difficulty about sending
a dignified coachman to the field to plow or "chop." A farm worker
of a reasonable degree of competence probably increases his efficiency
by making the frequent changes from one sort of common task to
another which are necessary on the farm.
The slaveholder had no compunctions about putting female slaves
in the field gangs. White women and girls of small-farm families also
worked in the fields to a considerable extent. Frederick Law Olmstead
reported: "I have, in fact, seen more white native American women at
work in the hottest sunshine in a single month, and that near mid
summer, in Mississippi and Alabama than in all my life in the Free
States, not on account of an emergency, as in harvesting, either, but
in the regular cultivation of cotton and of corn, chiefly of cotton." 11
However, white farm women and girls certainly did not go into the
fields as regularly as slave women and girls. The planter had an ad
vantage here as far as production of fields crops was concerned.
The cotton planter usually had his own gin and press while his
small-farm neighbor had to pay toll. Whether the planter had a
competitive advantage in his ownership depended upon the tolls paid
by the farmer. The advantage may have been the other way. Other
implements and tools used in cotton production and the implements
and tools used in tobacco farming were too simple and cheap to give
any advantage to the large-scale farmer in their use; it would be a
poor farmer indeed who could not afford a plow and a mule.
These competitive advantages of the plantation over the farm, to
the extent that they existed, were at least partially offset by certain
disadvantages. The overhead expenses of the large planter were pro
portionally greater than those of the small farmer. The large planter
had to hire an overseer or overseers and often had various other
functionaries such as manager, foreman, drivers, and yard boy. The pro-

Olmsted, Journey in the Back Country, 2: 65-67.
11 Ibid., 56. Cf. Gray, History of Agriculture in the Southern United States,
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duction and curing of tobacco required especially close supervision be
cause care in handling greatly affected the quality, which was an
important factor in determining price. The number of slaves which
could be supervised efficiently by one overseer was, therefore, smal!.12
The planter himself, the mistress, and the sons and daughters did not
ordinarily engage in physical labor, as did members of the small-farm
family. The plantation house was often literally overrun with domestic
servants.
If large-scale farming had possessed any considerable competitive
advantages over small-scale farming in producing cotton and tobacco,
there would not have been so many small farms and small plantations
devoted to their production. Perhaps one-half the cotton was grown
on farms where there were either no slaves at all or fewer than ten or
a dozen. 1 3 Such farms were too small to possess in any material degree
the alleged advantages of large-scale production. Probably an even
larger percentage of Southern tobacco was produced on small farms
or small plantations. Robert has shown that even in Charlotte County,
Virginia, where, in 1850, the average size of the tobacco farms was
greater than in any other county of the State, about 53 percent of the
crop was produced on plantations employing not more than ten or
twelve hands. Robert presents a frequency table showing for seven
Virginia counties the number of farms which produced tobacco in
1859 in quantities falling within each of several sets of limits. This
table seems to show that, except that farms with two hands were more
numerous than those with one-probably because large families were
more numerous than small-the numbers of tobacco farms employing
the several respective numbers of hands varied in regular fashion
inversely with the numbers of hands employed. 14 If the plantation had
possessed any appreciable advantages over the smaller farm this inverse
variation would not have been so regular.
The laborers employed on the typical small farm, that is the mem
bers of the white farm family, were almost certainly as efficient as the
slaves on the plantations, if and when the whites chose to exert them
selves to a reasonable extent. The qualification is essential, for many
whites did not choose to exert themselves very much. In the days of
the great slavery debate, Southern controversialists often enthusiastically
12 Robert, Tobacco Kingdom, 18; Taylor, Slaveholding in North Carolina,
89; Gray, History of Agriculture in the Southern States, 545.
13 Phillips, American Negro Slavery, 226.
14 These references are based on Robert, Tobacco Kingdom, 24 5-24 7, 249250.
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asserted that their slaves constituted the best trained and most efficient
labor force in the world. An occasional modern writer has placed a
high estimate on the effectiveness of the slaves.15 The typical slave
was certainly a more effective worker than the free Negro after eman
cipation, 16 but the great weight of the evidence is that slaves were not
as efficient as white workers of good quality. Ulrich B. Phillips seems
to have aptly characterized slave efficiency: "The generality of planters,
it would seem, considered it hopeless to make their field hands into
thorough workmen or full-fledged men, and contented themselves with
very moderate achievement. Tiring of endless correction and unfruitful
exhortation, they relied somewhat supinely upon authority with a tone
of kindly patronage and a baffled acquiescence in slack service." 17
The fathers of the Constitution expressed the prevailing estimate of
their time regarding the relative productiveness of whites and slaves
in the famous three-fifths clause.1 8 Olmsted, in the 1850s, thought slaves
were not nearly so effective as white farm workers in New York State.1 9
It has been quite common for writers, in trying to determine the
relative efficiency of Negro slave labor and free white labor, to compare
the slaves with the white wage labor of the plantation regions, but this
method is unsound. The plantation slaves were of average quality. The
wage earners were usually the poorest quality of whites, who worked

IS For example, Gray, History of Agriculture in the Southern United States,
361-364, 464-471.

16 Hammond, Cotton Industry, 186; Alfred Holt Stone, Studies in the
American Race Problem, 1 25-208 (New York, 1908); U. B. Phillips, "The Eco
nomics of Slave Labor in the South," in The South in the Building of the
Nation, 5: 1 2 1 (Richmond, 1 909); Edward Bryon Reuter, The American Race
Problem: A Study of the Negro, 227-256 (ed. 2, New York, 1938).
17

Life and Labor in the Old South, 200 (Boston,

1 929).

18 Max Farrand, ed.,The Records of the Federal Convention of I 787, l:
580-588; 3:253, 255, 342,400, 428-430 (ed. 2, New Haven,1937). C. C.
Pinckney,when reporting to the South Carolina House of Representatives put
it thus: "As we have found it necessary to give very extensive powers to the
federal government both over the persons and estates of the citizens, we thought
it right to draw one branch of the legislature immediately from the people, and
that both wealth and numbers should be considered in the representation. We
were at a loss, for some time, for a rule to ascertain the proportionate wealth
of the states. At last we thought that the productive labor of the inhabitants was
the best rule for ascertaining their wealth. In conformity to this rule,joined to
a spirit of concession,we determined that representatives should be apportioned
among the several states, by adding to the whole number of free persons three
fifths of the slaves."-p. 253.

19 Journey in the Back Country, 1:64, 83,90; 2:51, 106, 1 1 5, and A Jour
ney in the Seaboard Slave States, 1 85,203, 717 (New York,1 856). See also
Charles H. Wesley, Negro Labor in the United States, 1850-1925; A Study in
American Economic History, 3-6 (New York, 1 927).
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neither very hard nor very regularly. 20 Whites of any competence
either got land and farmed on their own account or found other
employment which was more remunerative than farm labor for hire.
Slave labor was efficient enough, if employed at tasks for which it
was adapted, to produce for the masters, taking one year with another,
an appropriable surplus over the cost of maintenance. However, the
appropriable surplus of the individual slave was normally so small
that a master could not enjoy a large income unless he had a large
number of slaves. 2 1 A farmer with a few slaves worked along with
them and made a somewhat better living than his neighbor who had
no slaves. A farmer with a larger number of slaves might escape physi
cal toil and enjoy a still higher standard of living. Only the great
planters could live in a liberal style. The evidence seems conclusive
that planters with fewer than about fifteen slaves did not live wel!. 22
Except, then, in special cases like sugar and rice where much
capital other than slaves was required for effective production, the
much touted advantage of the plantation with slave labor over the
small farm with white labor reduces to about this: The plantation
could not produce more in proportion to land and equipment or to
the number of hands employed; if large enough it could produce more
goods and leisure for the white family. That, in all common sense, was
why people acquired slaves and ran plantations. The small farm with
reasonably good management and reasonable industry on the part of
members of the farm family afforded at least as high a standard of
living as the plantation afforded the planter family and the slaves
averaged together.
Why, then, if Negro slave labor was not inherently superior to free
white labor, and if the plantation possessed little, if any, competitive
advantage over the small farm as a unit of agricultural organization,
did nonslaveholding whites fail to produce a larger share of the cotton
and tobacco? There were several reasons.
First and foremost come the major matters of enterprise and
managerial ability. Nowadays, the more competent and industrious

20 Taylor, Slaveholding in North Carolina, 80, Gray, History of Agriculture
in the Southern United States, 468; Frederick Law Olmsted, Journeys and Ex
p/orations in the Cotton Kingdom l: 82 (London, 1861), and Journey in the
Back Country, 1: 255; 2: 1 2-13, 29.
21

Gray, History of Agriculture in the Southern United States, 474.

Olmsted made this, point over and over again with much illustrative de
tail. For examples, see his Journey in the Seaboard Slave States, 329, 384-386,
393, 559-563, and Journey in the Back Country, 1: 174-196, 230- 231, 261-266;
2 : 22, 88, 167-174.
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farmers in any community generally get the better land and larger
acreages. In slavery days in the South, the better farmers got the more
desirable lands, larger holdings, and also the slaves to work them and
grew more cotton and tobacco. If a small farmer in the cotton or
tobacco belt prospered by growing the staple of his region or otherwise,
the natural and attractive thing to do was to buy land and slaves as
he could. If he continued to thrive, he would eventually become a
planter. Thus a small farmer would have been "driven out" by a
planter. Of course the man who inherited land and slaves had a better
chance of remaining in the planter class than one who had inherited
nothing had of entering it. However, many a young man who inherited
wealth in slavery days mismanaged his patrimony, lost it in whole or in
part, and ended his days in "reduced" circumstances, while many a
young man who started with neither land or slaves became a pros
perous planter. Thomas J. Wertenbaker has shown that the planter
class originated in this latter fashion in colonial times. 2 3 Olmsted ad
mitted that small farmers were not debarred from becoming planters
in the ante helium period. 24 One suspects that most farmers who
prospered did so not because they had come by land and slaves but
because they attended to business and managed well, while most of
those who failed did so because they took life too easy and managed
badly. Credit has too often been given to slavery or the farm organiza
tion which rightfully belongs to the master.
Secondly, even in the staple-growing districts, the small farmers
did not have as strong incentives to grow the staples for market as the
planters had. They found it to their advantage to do a more general
type of farming with more household manufacturing. In contrast,
planters almost of necessity produced for the market. There would
have been few planters if it had not been possible to grow market
crops profitably on plantations. As a rule, a master will not employ a
large force in a self-sufficing economy, because, after a certain volume
of production has been reached, an additional application of labor can
contribute but little to satisfy the wants of the farmer and his family
but only to raise the standard of living of the laborers, something in
which an employer is only mildly interested. 25 In a self-sufficing
economy in America a family with a considerable number of slaves
would have enjoyed a rude plenty and have been freed from grinding
toil but would have had the various cares and worries involved in slave2 2-48
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holding. A family without slaves would have enjoyed the same rude
plenty, and although it must have engaged in hard labor, would not
have had the cares and worries of the slaveholding family. A planter
in the ante bellum South produced the various necessary and desirable
articles for home consumption which could be produced cheaper on
the plantation than they could be bought in the market. However, the
wants of the slaves were simple, perforce, and easily satisfied, and the
demand of the planter's family for such articles was limited. These
wants having been satisfied, the planter sought to produce as large a
salable surplus as possible in order that he might command for his
slaves certain things from outside the community which might be
necessary for their continued efficiency and for himself and family the
various articles of necessity, comfort, and luxury which could not, or
at least not advantageously, be produced on the plantation. The small
nonslaveholding farmer, on the contrary, found it desirable to devote
a larger share of his labor to the production of the numerous articles
for consumption which could be produced advantageously at home,
because, in proportion to numbers, the farmer family consumed larger
quantities of such things than did the planter family and the slaves
together.
The small farmer of the nineteenth century had a further reason
for carrying on more self-sufficing activities than the planter. This
was the feeling, already mentioned, that white women and girls, al
though allowed to work at various household industries which were
just as useful and productive as plowing and hoeing, nevertheless,
should not be expected to labor in the fields. The planter was under
no moral pressure not to send his female slaves into the fields.
The planter had a further reason to concentrate his efforts on the
growing of cotton or other staples in the fact that Negro slave labor
was relatively more efficient therein than in the production of the
various other things commonly produced on Southern farms in slavery
days, for examples, fruit, poultry, dairy products, bacon, lard, soap,
candles, whiskey, coarse textiles, clothing, and axe and hoe handles.
The planter, on this account, sometimes found it to his advantage to
grow more cotton or tobacco and buy other things. The small farmer
and his family, on the other hand, could produce the varied articles of
the general farm more effectively than could the slaves and, therefore,
more often found it advantageous to produce them at home instead
of buying them at the store. 26 The fact that in a given community

26 Cf. Walter L. Fleming, "The Slave-Labor System in the Ante-Bellum
South," in The South in the Building of the Nation, 5: 16. A planter told the
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planters specialized more in producing the great Southern staples while
small farmers went in more for general farming does not of itself prove
that white labor was less efficient than slave labor in cotton and
tobacco, as has so often been assumed; it can just as well prove that
white labor was more efficient than slave labor in general farming.
In comparisons of slave-labor plantations with small white-labor
farms this simple fact has been too frequently overlooked. Even if
the former had competitive advantages over the latter in the produc
tion of a crop, say cotton, the small farmers nevertheless would have
grown that crop for a living if thereby they could have made a better
or easier living than by producing something else. Nowadays small
farmers in large areas of the South find it advisable to devote their
major efforts to producing cotton, tobacco, or some other crop or
crops for market while buying at the store a great variety of articles
formerly produced at home; but the fact that they do so now does
not prove that they would have done so in the 1830s or 1850s if it had
not been for slavery. The abolition of slavery almost certainly made the
Negroes of the South less effective as producers of farm products. It
is certainly wrong to assume that it was the abolition of slavery only,
or even principally, which gave the small farmers their "opportunity."
The same general factors have operated to further commercialize
agriculture in the South that have operated elsewhere, namely, cheap
transportation, which has enabled people to get more for what they
sell and to pay less for what they buy; the industrial revolution, which
has made it possible to manufacture more and better goods in the mills
and factories in towns and cities at incomparably lower costs than they
can be made on farms; and the agricultural revolution, particularly
the introduction of improved farm machinery, which has encouraged
specialization and commercialization by making it too expensive to
own machinery applicable to more than one or two crops and too
great a handicap in competition not to adopt some of it.27
Since planters had such strong incentives to produce staple crops
for market, they must remain where there was access to markets.
Small farmers, who did relatively more subsistence farming regardless
of location, were not under such pressure to remain in the commercia
lized farming districts. Therefore, if planter neighbors made attractive

English geographer, Robert Russell, that the reason more planters did not raise
hogs and make their own bacon was that the Negroes would steal the little pigs
and roast them. North America, Its Agriculture and Climate, 265 (Edinburgh,
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offers for the land, the farmers might find it to their advantage to sell
and move to a more remote region where land was cheaper but about
as well adapted to their type of farming.
The American people during the slavery period were already a race
of land speculators. Large numbers moved to the frontier and sub
mitted for the time to frontier living conditions with the hope that
the "progress of the country" and especially the development of means
of transportation would soon catch up with them and give their lands
a value far in excess of the original cost. Masters with numerous slaves
would not or could not be frontiersmen unless the frontier had natural
facilities for transportation to market and could almost at once be
reduced to cultivation. If they had debts, as most masters did, they
were under strong economic compulsion to get cash incomes every
year. It follows, therefore, that the proportion of small farmers in the
commercialized-farming districts would tend to be reduced by this
movement toward the frontier. If a few years later the planter follow
ed the small farmer to the erstwhile frontier and bought up his farm,
the farmer was not injured; at least he had done what he had hoped
to do and could move on to a new frontier to repeat the process. 28
Once a given district became rather thickly settled with masters
and slaves, small farmers moved out to get away from the "niggers"
and live in a neighborhood where there were more of their own kind.
Repelling them from good neighborhoods was probably the principal
way in which slavery worked to the economic detriment of nonslave
holding whites. Some of the best lands in the South today are being
cultivated by Negroes, who are in general less efficient farmers than
whites, because once the Negroes were there in great numbers, the
whites would not move in.29
It is true, of course, that if slavery had never been established in the
United States and, therefore, the plantation system had not developed
extensively, the lands held by planters would have been held by small
farmers who, in many instances no doubt, would have been the same
persons who were planters. In that hypothetical case, being located
near transportation facilities and finding prices, at least of cotton,
somewhat higher than they actually were by reason of the smaller
production which would have occurred, small farmers would have
grown greater quantities of cotton and tobacco, but considerably less

28 Olmsted, Journey in the Seaboard Slave States, 576-577; Frederick Jack
son Turner, Rise of the New West, 90-92 (New York and London, 1906);
Fleming, "The Slave-Labor System in the Ante-Bellum South," 107, 113-114.
29 Phillips, American Negro Slavery, 396.

-65-

than actually were grown in the South by planters and farmers
combined. In this sense, then, slavery may be said to have "driven"
nonslaveholding farmers out of staple production and deprived them
of an economic opportunity. This is far different from the usual im
plication, namely, that plantations produced a great quantity of cotton
and tobacco very cheaply and thereby depressed prices so greatly that,
while planters continued to make money, small white farmers could
not make a living by growing the staples. Futhermore, even this con
cession requires qualification. It may well be that, if slavery had never
been established in the South or, although established, had been
abolished later, the direct benefits conferred upon small farmers by
the absence or removal of competition from plantations and slaves
would have been more than offset by the possible injury to the prosper
ity of the section as a whole.30
The farmer folk of the South who received the most meager re
wards were the "poor whites." Slavery has so often been blamed for
the condition and even the existence of the poor whites that their
relation to the institution seems to require special mention.
The poor whites were the ne'er-do-wells of the Southern country
side. They were poor, ignorant, shiftless, and almost utterly lacking in
pride and the desire to improve their lot. They lived on the poorer
lands interspersed among the plantations and better farms or in the
pine barrens, sand hills, or other undesirable locations. In some cases
they owned the land they occupied, in others they were merely squat
ters. They lived from hand to mouth. They farmed in a feeble sort of
way, raising a little corn and garden truck and keeping a few hogs.
Sometimes they raised a little cotton or tobacco. They hunted and
fished a little. Some of them made corn whiskey and sold it to the
planters and the slaves. They did odd jobs now and then for neighbor
ing planters or farmers but shunned steady employment. They were
often suspected of doing a lot of petty stealing from their more pro
vident neighbors. Occasionally the terms "low whites" and "mean
whites" were used to denote them. 31
The abolitionists were fond of denominating all the nonslaveholding
whites of the Southern countryside as poor whites. This was a libel
30 Robert R. Russel, "The General Effects of Slavery upon Southern Econ
omic Progress," Journal of Southern History, 4: 34-54 (February 1938).
31 Good descriptions are Paul H. Buck, "The Poor Whites of the Ante
Bellum South," American Historical Review, 31:41-54 (October 1925); and
Den Hollander, "The Tradition of 'Poor Whites'," 40 3-431. Frank L. and Har
riet C. Owsley almost reason the poor whites away.-"The Economic Basis of
Society in the Late Ante-Bellum South," Journal of Southern History, 6: 24-45
(February 1940).
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on the great majority of the small farmers of the section, who were
reasonably industrious and self respecting and, in general, made a
fairly comfortable living. There were, however, thousands of poor
whites. William Gregg, a public-spirited cotton manufacturer of South
Carolina, once estimated that one-third of the white population of his
State belonged to that class.32 However accurate his estimate may have
been, they were found in all the Southern States and the proportion
was too high in all.
There seem to have been several causes for the development of the
poor-white class. The poor quality of a large proportion of the inden
tured servants, so numerous in the South in colonial days, may explain
it in part. The comparative ease of getting a living of a sort in a
country where land, at least poor land, was so cheap, where corn,
vegetables, and fruits grew without much care, where game, fish, and
edible wild plants abounded, and where winters were short and mild,
contributed to easy-going ways. Because of various historical factors,
which will readily occur to anyone familiar with American colonial
history, there had not been the feeling of community responsibility in
the South that there had been in Puritan New England to insist that
individuals conform to community standards of industry, thrift, and
morality. Perhaps the principal cause was hookworm and repeated at
tacks of malaria, which sapped people's vitality and robbed them of
hope and ambition, although it is not entirely clear whether people
became poor whites because they had contracted hookworm or got
hookworm because they were poor whites. The class of poor whites
in all probability would have developed if slavery had never been intro
duced. There are poor whites now two generations after emancipation,
and in spite of a greater density of population, better health services,
more varied industry, public schools, and the many inducements to
exertion offered by modern civilization. Similiar classes, under different
names, although perhaps not so great in numbers, are to be found in
other parts of the country; and, for that matter, the same general type
may be found in varying proportions in every country on the globe.
However, in at least two ways slavery seems to have contributed to
the formation of the poor-white class of the South. Contrary to the
usual rule, many of the poorer whites might have been better off as
farm laborers under supervision than as independent farmers, but
slavery retarded the development of a wage-earning class in the planta
tion districts. Originally planters had resorted to the use of bound
32 DeBow's Review, August 1851, p. 133. Cf. Gray, History of Agriculture
in the Southern United States, 487.
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servants because competent free laborers were scarce in a country
where it was so easy for people of any competence at all to become
independent farmers on land of their own. Once slavery was firmly
established in a district, it in turn discouraged the development of a
free-labor class.33 Planters preferred slaves to the poorer sort of whites.
They also hesitated to attempt to use wage laborers instead of slaves,
because, until a large wage-earning class should have developed, they
could feel no assurance of being able to fill the vacancies that were
certain to occur. Whites would not work in field gangs along with
slaves under overseers. If it had not been for slavery, people with
managerial ability might have made greater efforts to get the poor
whites to work for wages or to rent the better lands and might have
succeeded, as they did, in a measure, other things contributing, after
the War for Southern Independence. By creating the black belts in
ways described in preceding paragraphs, slavery created a social con
dition conducive to the development of such a class of poor whites.
The more enterprising and intelligent of the small farmers either got
out of the staple belts or graduated into the planter class leaving the
less enterprising and less intelligent behind on poor lands which the
planters could not use. Planters, having their own social life, took
little interest in and felt little responsibility for their poor-white
neighbors, except, perhaps, at election time. If the small-farmer popu
lation had remained larger, there might have been more churches,
more schools, and a more wholesome community life in general, which
would have given some stimulus, encouragement, and aid to the
weaker and less fortunate members of society.34
Slavery was certainly no more detrimental to nonslaveholding
whites engaged in nonagricultural occupations than it was to small
farmers. There seems to have been no dearth of employment in the
Southern countryside for such white artisans as there were. It is true
that planters often had slaves trained in various skilled crafts, and they
often became excellent workmen. They were, indeed, frequently hired
out by their masters to neighbors who needed their services. 35 In
33 This point is developed more fully in Robert R. Russel, "The Economic
History of Negro Slavery in the United States," 3 17-319.
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general, however, the Negro artisans were not as competent as the
white, and the latter were preferred. It was the scarcity of the white
artisans which caused planters to resort to training slaves in the trades.
This scarcity, in turn, was due to the strong inducement there was all
through this period for people of good quality to get land and live on
it.
In the cities and towns of the slaveholding States, white wage
earners had to compete with free Negroes and with Negro slaves, who
were either employed in their masters' businesses, hired out by their
masters to other employers, or allowed to hire their own time. Such
free Negroes and slaves worked at practically every sort of task. 36 They
had a monopoly of domestic service. Either because of its character,
or because Negroes had so long predominated in it, or both, the whites
had come to look upon such service as menial and degrading, and
employers preferred the Negroes because they were more obsequious.
In other occupations the whites and Negroes, sometimes of both sexes,
worked side by side, usually, but not always, with some distinction in
tasks in favor of the whites. For example, in the Tredegar Iron
Works at Richmond, Virginia, each white master workman was given
a Negro "assistant." 3 7
The white workers frequently resented the presence of the blacks,
either because of race prejudice, or dislike of their competition, or both,
and sought to have them excluded from the pursuits concerned. There
was, for example, a strike of the white workers in the Tredegar works
having this object, but it was unsuccessful, as were all other efforts to
exclude Negroes. Employers could not afford to allow such a principle
to be established, as white workers were not sufficiently numerous and
permanent in most localities to permit reliance on them alone. The use
of slaves, if they belonged to the owners of the business, gave the
employers assurance that operations would not be interrupted or wages
forced to too high levels by strikes and withdrawals; and, even if the
slaves were hired from others, the assurance was nearly as great, for
still there could be no strikes, and labor contracts were usually made
for a year at a time. 3 8
36 Phillips, American Negro Slavery, 402-424; Wesley, Negro Labor in the
United States, 1-28; Gray, History of Agriculture in the Southern United States,
467, 566 ; Kathleen Bruce, Virginia Iron Manufacture in the Slave Era, ch. 6

(New York and London, 193 1); A. H. Stone, "Free Contract Labor in the
Ante-Bellum South," in The South in the Building of the Nation, 5: 142.
3 7 For reasons not entirely clear, the hands in Virginia tobacco factories
were nearly all Negroes,-Bruce, Virginia Iron Manufacture, 238-240; Robert,
The Tobacco Kingdom, 197-208.
38 Wesley, Negro Labor in the United States, 69-86; Phillips, American
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In the skilled trades the white workingmen were more efficient and
were, therefore, preferred. Negro competition was not keen. 39 In
unskilled and semiskilled labor the superiority of white workers to
slaves was not so great, if, indeed any existed, but in general white
workers had no difficulty in getting jobs, excepting, of course, that
they sought none in domestic service. As the middle period wore on
and the demand for labor in the cotton and sugar belts grew, there was
a tendency for slave labor to be drawn from the towns to the farms
where white labor was not available, leaving places in towns open to
the whites. This tendency was reinforced by the increasing difficulty of
handling slaves amid urban surroundings and by the better adapta
bility, generally speaking, of slaves to agriculture than to urban occu
pations.
Nonslaveowning employers of labor in the cities had no particular
disadvantage in competition with slaveowning employers as they would
have had in the country, for they were able to hire either whites, slaves,
free Negroes, or all three. In fact, railroad companies, manufacturing
concerns, etc. usually found it necessary or desirable to start with hired
labor, free or slave, because with hired labor it was not necessary to
raise so much capital at the outset. Employers sometimes preferred to
hire their hands also, because this permitted a selection more in accord
with existing needs and enabled the employers to expand or contract
their labor forces and more readily adjust production to the state of
business.40
In slavery days the cities and towns of the South, being neither
numerous nor large, derived their support principally from plantation
districts, where there were many slaves, rather than from small-farming
regions, where there were few. It was chiefly the planters who bought,
sold, borrowed, travelled, and sent their children to academies and
colleges. It seems quite certain, therefore, that if it had not been for
plantations and slavery, the cities and towns of the South would have
been even fewer and smaller, resulting in even less opportunity for
nonslaveholding whites.
In the days of the great slavery debate, the abolitionists, when

Negro Slavery, 4 1 3; Robert Royal Russel, Economic Aspects of Southern Sec
tionalism, 1840-1861, p. 53 , 218-220 (Urbana, 1924); Olmsted, Journey in the
Back Country, 1: 199-200; 2: 57; Bruce, Virginia Iron Manufacture, 234-237,

243-244.
39

Phillips, American Negro Slavery,

403 ,

table.

40 Robert, Tobacco Kingdom, 199; Gray, History of Agriculture in the
Southern United States, 566; Russel, Economic Aspects of Southern Sectional
ism, 210-211, 219.
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pressed closely to show how slavery injured the nonslaveholding whites,
always replied that it did so by inspiring a contempt for manual labor
among all whites who came in contact with it. This answer still finds
favor in the textbooks. The writer has examined the contention at some
length in another place and found that there was a grain of truth in
it but little more than a grain.41
In conclusion, Negro slavery was in some respects to the economic
advantage of many of the nonslaveholding whites of the slaveholding
regions; in others it was to their disadvantage. To many nonslave
holding whites it was a matter of economic indifference. It is impossible
to strike a balance in which confidence can be placed. It is certain
that the net injury, if there was any, has commonly been grossly
exaggerated. The fact that nonslaveholding whites did not seek to
destroy the institution as injurious to their economic interests may
only show that their common sense operating upon a familiar matter
was sounder than the economics of abolitionists theorizing at a distance
or of some modem historians theorizing after a long lapse of time.

41 Robert R. Russel, "The General Effects of Slavery upon Southern Econ
omic Progress," 37-40; See also Phillips, American Negro Slavery, 397-398.
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A Revaluation of the Period Before
the Civil War: Railroads
By

ROBERT R. RUSSEL

Reprinted from The Mississippi Valley Historical Review,
XV (December 1928), 341-54.

T

HERE HAS been a growing realization of late that the building
and improvement of railroads constituted an important factor in
the history of the period before the Civil War. We are coming to
realize that we must take them more into account both in explaining
the rapid transformation American society was undergoing and in
interpreting the politics of that time. And it is a far cry from the treat
ment accorded railroads in one of the older political histories to that
found in Beard's Rise of American Civilization, for example.l
Our comparative neglect of the railroad factor in the past has evi
dently been chiefly due to our preoccupation with the slavery question.
To a great degree, however, this neglect may be attributed, it would
seem, to the unusually voluminous, varied, and rather inaccessible
character of the sources. These sources are gradually being mastered,
by a policy of attrition, and we have at length accumulated a con
siderable mass of monographic and other secondary literature on rail
roads, some of it definitively done. In a short paper one cannot attempt
a description of this literature.2 Its existence makes a revaluation of
the period a simpler matter and our failure to make such a revaluation
less justifiable.

1 Special mention should be made, also, of W. E. Dodd, Expansion and
Conflict (Boston, 1915), chaps. x, xi, and of C. R. Fish, The Rise of the Com
mon Man (New York, 1927). There are some good generalizations, although
scattered and incomplete, in Edward Channing, History of the United States
(New York, 1905-1925), V, VI.
2 There is a rather full bibliography for the period in B. H. Meyer (ed.),
History of Transportation in the United States before I 860 (Washington, 1917).
Another good bibliography is in F. A. Cleveland and F. W. Powell, Railroad
Promotion and Capitalization in the United States (New York, 1909).
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Granted, there are still great gaps in our secondary material. For
example, we do not yet have a definitive railroad history of the Old
Northwest for this period treating the section as a unit.3 Such a study
would reveal, better than any other, the complex factors which de
termined the location of railroads where physical contour was not
fundamental. It should also give considerable light on the beginnings
of consolidation and on the economic and social effects of the coming
of railroads into more or less isolated communities. Someone should do
for the Old Dominion what Professor Phillips has done for the eastern
cotton belt.4 Nowhere was there a more insistent, revealing, and signi
ficant public agitation conducted in behalf of railroads from the point
of view of public policy and in behalf of state aid to railroad com
panies.5 Perhaps no state illustrates better than Virginia the great ob
stacles to a reasonable state-aid program which lay in vested interests
and in local rivalries, jealousies, and ambitions. Someone might well
bring together and organize the scattered facts about railroad rates
before the Civil War. We still await a definitive account of the Pacific
railway issue in American politics during the period, showing, among
other things, how it was interrelated with the slavery and other great
domestic issues of the time and with our isthmian diplomacy. Perhaps
more than anything else we need a much greater number of good
economic and social histories of particular communities into which
early railroads entered ;6 such histories would enable us to speak with
authority about the economic and social effects of railroads-a subject
on which it is too easy to generalize without data. These and other
gaps in our secondary literature must be filled in before we can make
anything like a final evaluation of the railroad factor in the history of
the period. They do not excuse us, however, from making attempts
at evaluation with the materials we have.
Now what can we do with our railroad material in its present state
in the way of revaluing the period before the Civil War?7 For one thing
3 We have William F. Gephart, Transportation and Industrial Development
in the Middle West (New York, 1909), and F. L. Paxson, "The Railroads of

the 'Old Northwest' before the Civil War," Wisconsin Academy of Sciences,
Arts and Letters, Transactions, XVII, 243-74.
4 U. B. Phillips, A History of Transportation in the Eastern Cotton Belt
to 1860 (New York, 1908).
5 A phase of this propaganda is described in C. H. Ambler, Sectionalism in
Virginia from 1776-1851 (Chicago, 1910), 311-19.
6 An example of the sort of work we need is B. H. Hibbard, History of
Agriculture in Dane County, Wisconsin (Madison, 1904).
7 The writer has had occasion to read rather extensively in the sources. It
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we should be able to give a more accurate and truthful description
and explanation of the great economic and social changes which
occurred. Railroads helped to take people west and to settle lands there
which otherwise must have remained unoccupied. They, with other
improved means of transportaion, obliterated old frontiers, revolution
ized the character of the new frontier, and by 1860 bade fair to carry
it forward with seven-league boots. Improved means of transportation
caused self-sufficing rural economy to give way to commercial agricul
ture with distant markets.8 The railroads not only brought prosperity
to countless rural communities but they caused countless others, some
times century old, to die out, unable to withstand the new competition
with more naturally favored districts far away. Even before the Civil
War, railroads were making some towns into cities and blasting the
prospects of others. Along with other improved means of transportation
and communication, they largely conditioned the progress of the
industrial revolution-by providing wide markets, by bringing together
raw materials and food supplies at manufacturing centers, and by
themselves utilizing and thus stimulating various manufactures.9 Im
provements in transportation, at various stages, built up promising
home industries in many localities only for successive improvements to
destroy them to the advantage of more favorably located competitors
in other sections of the country. The building of railroads withdrew
thousands of laborers from other occupations thus forcing changes
therein and encouraging immigration. Railroads ruthlessly annihilated
vested interests in the form of canal and turnpike companies, stage
lines, and, later, steamboat lines. They contributed greatly to the
evolution of business organization. 10 They were instrumental in greatly
increasing travel and the commingling of people, thus spreading ideas
and notions more rapidly and releasing social energies.1 1 They con-

would be impossible to cite all the material which has contributed to the vari
ous items in this evaluaton, and no attempt will be made to do so.
8 See especially R. M. Tryon, Household Manufactures in the United States,
1640-1860 (Chicago, 19 1 7); P. W. Bidwell, "The Agricultural Revolution in
New England," American Historical Review, XXVI, 683-702; and P. W. Bid
well and J. I. Falconer, History of Agriculture in the Northern United States,
1620-1860 (Washington, 1 925), chap. xxiv.

9 The best summary is in Victor S. Clark, History of Manufactures in the
United States, 1607-1860 (Washington, 19 1 6), chap. xiv.
10 For sugge&tions see Guy S. Callender, "The Early Transportation and
Banking Enterprises of the States in Relation to the Growth of Corporations,"
Quarterly Journal of Economics, XVII, 11 1-62.
11 C. R. Fish, in writing of early railway cars, contributes an illuminating
bit of interpretation: "This type, however, gave way to the long car, with two
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tributed greatly to the growth of the United States mails. The telegraph
enabled the daily newspaper to garner its crop of news, the railroads
in part made possible the larger reading public necessary to the support
of these news-gathering and news-mongering agencies.12 Improved
means of communication and travel helped to establish the convention
habit among the people of the forties and fifties, and conventions nour
ished all the "isms." Improved means of travel and communication
greatly influenced our political methods and organization.This outline
of changes caused or conditioned by improved means of transportation
and communication might be extended.But some such outline as this,
rounded out with accurate illustrative detail and animated with sym
pathy for and understanding of human beings of all classes and condi
tions, should find its way into our general histories.
A study of our railroad material will convince one that we have not
been estimating highly enough the initiative, inventiveness, foresight,
and boldness of intelligent Americans in the middle period. They
grasped with astonishing quickness the utilities of the railroad and the
possibilities of improving it. The remarkable fact is not that the rail
roads were first popularly considered as probably useful supplements
to existing water transportation systems, but how quickly bolder spirits
saw that they could become competitors and alter the course of trade
and how promptly they acted upon their vision.Said a director of the
Baltimore and Ohio Railroad Company, when construction on that
line was begun, 1828: "We are about opening a channel through which
the commerce of the mighty country beyond the Allegheny must seek
the ocean ..."13 For the writer of this paper, at least, it illuminates
the character of the American people to know that a large proportion
of the early railroad lines in this country, short as they were, were built
as "links" in "chains" continental in their extent, some of them not
connecting with established water routes except at their termini. Most
of our present main lines east of the Mississippi existed on paper as
chains of railroads years before more than the first links had been

double seats divided by an aisle.Just why this change was made it is difficult to
say, but it is significant that when it was complete, the American traveled every
where, whether by canal boat, steamer or train, in a long narrow saloon, in
close association with his fellow travelers, and with the opportunity for general
conversation or for the expression of his opinion before an audience, willing
or unwilling," op. cit., 82.
12 I know of no work which attempts to show the correlation between rail
roads and newspaper circulation. There are so many factors making for an in
creased circulation that probably no such attempt would be of value.
13 Archer B.Hulbert, The Paths of Inland Commerce (New Haven, 1921),
149.
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actually constructed. Not all early paper systems materialized, but most
did; promoters read aright their physical geography and the signs of
the times. The necessity of consolidating these chains under single
companies, if railroads were to compete successfully with water routes
for the carriage of heavy through freight, was not at once realized,
to be sure, but consolidation in the form we know it had fairly begun
before 1861. American inventive genius did not falter in the task of
supplying the improvements necessary to make the railroad an efficient
agency of transportation for heavy freight over vast distances; American
engineers and builders eagerly watched developments on the other side
of the water. The American public, once it had caught the spirit, con
stantly and confidently expected that the improvements would be forth
coming to meet the demands of a "new age." Our more philosophic
citizens attempted to evaluate the railroad's economic, social, political,
and moral significance for their time and for "generations yet unborn."
Our railroad history contains ample material to illustrate the truth of
Charles and Mary Beard's statement: "When at last the cloud lifts,
when the fundamental course of American civilization is seen in a
long, unbroken development, when the sharp curves of years are
smoothed by the reckoning of centuries, then if all signs do not fail
the middle period of American history will appear as the most change
ful, most creative, most spirited epoch between the founding of the
colonies and the end of the nineteenth century."14
Certainly in the past our general histories have dealt too largely,
relatively speaking, with politics. As we work up our detailed knowl
edge of the history of transportation, manufactures, agriculture, public
lands, immigration, education, culture, various reform movements, and
other subjects, we shall be able to correct the emphasis. But much in
our politics requires revaluation in the light of the facts about these
other subjects.
Our state and local politics in the period concerned, have been
treated too often as completely subordinated to and bound up with
national politics. Complaints were indeed numerous in the ante-bellum
period that state and local party contests turned altogether too largely
on national issues. Such complaints were justified, but it is easy to
exaggerate. There were all sorts of state and local issues which shared
with national questions the interest and attention of politicians and
people generally. Between 1845 and 1860 no questions figured more
largely in state and local politics outside of New England, possibly,
than railroad questions.
14 The Rise of American Civilization (New York, 1927), I, 632.
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It could not be otherwise. The building of railroads was a matter
of vital public interest. People were quick to grasp their economic and
some of their social and political effects. They understood well enough
that the outlines of a permanent transportation system were being laid
down, and they realized accordingly that the determination of the
location of railroads at the moment was fated with consequences for
the future of their communities. In fact, they exaggerated the impor
tance of the location of particular railroads, not foreseeing the great
multiplication of lines in later years. From the point of state policy,
a properly planned railroad system would settle the vacant lands, open
mineral and other natural resources to exploitation, increase the tax
able wealth, and build up cities within the commonweath with trade
which otherwise might seek "commercial metropolises" in other states.
If a city could secure a radiating system of these arteries of commerce,
"its life blood," its future greatness seemed assured. And as Governor
Bebb of Ohio said: "-wo to the commercial city that suffers these
[artificial] rivers to be diverted from it."15 Farming communities rea
lized no less well their interests in the routes railroads might take.
"Every farmer along the line wants the road to run by his front door,"
said one harassed railroad president. In the South, where there was
concern about southern decline, railroads were presented as an agency
that might regenerate the economic life of the section, give it a varied
industry, free it from galling dependence on the North, attract immi
gration, and enable it to contest more equally in the national councils.16
With such public interests involved, and I have not named all of
them, all the agencies of social control were enlisted to assist in getting
the roads properly located and built. The merits of rival routes were
fought out in conventions, in newspaper columns, on the stump and
platform, and in the pulpit, and the purchase of stocks and bonds was
urged on grounds of civic pride and public spirit as well as of economic
self-interest. Under the special-charter system, which generally pre
vailed, struggles over railroad routes were carried into the legislatures.
Pressure was brought to bear upon legislatures to make railroad charters
more and more liberal. The legislatures were requested to build rail
roads, or to grant state aid to private companies, or to permit municipal
divisions to vote such aid, or, if constitutional provisions forbade state
or local aid, to call constitutional conventions to alter the inconvenient

15 DeBow's Review, VIII, 444.
16

R. R. Russel, Economic Aspects of Southern Sectionalism, 1840-61 (Ur

bana, 1924).
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sections.I 7 Cities, counties, and townships were asked to vote bonds or
subscribe stock, where constitutions and laws permitted. But such mea
sures met opposition. The American people in the pre-Civil War period
were individualistic. There was fear of corporations. There was the
Jeffersonian tradition of non-interference. Laissez faire proclivities had
been confirmed by experiences during the panic of 1837 and its after
math. There was opposition to railroads from vested interests which
would be injuriously affected-canal companies, turnpike companies,
steamboat lines, stage lines. So railroad questions became campaign
issues and led to spirited contests which we can not recount here. Even
in years when the slavery controversy was most bitter, numerous state
contests, to say nothing of local, turned primarily on the question of
state aid to railroads or other railroad matters. It is doubtful whether
any other subject occupied more of the time and interest of state legis
latures in the period from 1848 to 1860 than did railroads. It is doubt
ful whether the average citizen in the West gave as much interest and
attention to the slavery question, in the same period, as to railroad
questions.
The general historian who would give a true picture of American
life should insert paragraphs on the more or less corrupt influence of
railroads upon politics years before the day of Oakes Ames and Credit
Mobilier. Politico-railroad scandals were not as common before the
Civil War as they afterwards became, to be sure, but the explanation
for their comparative infrequency in the former period seems to lie
chiefly in the deficiencies of the press of that time and a lack of tender
ness in the public conscience with regard to business in politics. To
illustrate, remarkably large numbers of railroad men were elected or
appointed to offices in which they would be concerned with railroad
matters; remarkably large numbers of state or locally prominent politi
cians became railroad presidents or financial agents without prejudice
to their influence in party councils or their chances for political prefer
ment.
Railroad issues figured in our national politics also. There was the
Western demand for congressional grants of land in aid of railroads.
This was one of the major western policies of the period. It lead to
lengthy congressional debates and to all sorts of political combinations,
log-rolling, lobbying, jobbery, and corruption. A land grant having been
obtained from Congress, its history was only begun, both in the arena
17 In 1852 New Orleans was given a new charter largely to facilitate the
giving of aid to railroad companies, and Louisiana adopted a new constitution
of which the most important feature was the absence of the former prohibition
of state aid to corporation�.
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of national and in that of state politics. There was the issue of the
tariff on railroad iron-by no means an insignificant one. There was
the difficult question of the remuneration to be paid the railroad com
panies for transporting mails, troops, and government freight. The
building of railroads increased the number of cases concerning the
bridging of navigable rivers.18
Accounts of the acquisition of Oregon, California, and New Mexico
could be made more truthful and satisfying by putting them against
a background of progress in means of transportation and communica
tion. The process of acquisition was accompanied by interesting debates
in Congress and out as to the ability of the United States to colonize,
assimilate, and retain such distant possession with such a vast mountain
barrier separating them from the settled eastern states. 19 The pro
ponents of acquisition expressed great confidence in the political prop
erties of steam and electricity. "Manifest destiny" was manifest to men
who were witnessing the wonders of a revolution in means of communi
cation and travel.
The issue of better means of communication with the Pacific coast,
whether by Pacific railroad or isthmian projects, deserves greater con
sideration than has as yet been accorded it in accounts of American
politics of the dozen years before the Civil War. The conquest over
nature which would necessarily be involved appealed powerfully to
the imagination of the generation. The stakes involved in the solution
of the problem were supposed to be, and were, enormous. Failure to
provide proper facilities might result in estrangement and separation
of the coast communities or their loss in a war with a strong naval
power. The choice of route for a transcontinental railroad would
powerfully affect the future prosperity of cities, states, and strong rail
road interests farther east. It would largely give direction to the
colonization of the coast and of the great plains, and that, in turn,
would have important bearing on the balance of political power
between the sections engaged in the struggle over slavery and other
issues. A decision in favor of a railroad built and operated by the
government might go far toward altering the character of our govern-

18 These matters are discussed satisfactorily in Lewis H. Haney, A Congres
sional History of Railways in the United States (Madison, 1906-10), I and II;
and John B. Sanborn, Congressional Grants of Land in Aid of Railways (Madi

son, 1899 ).

19 See especially Cong. Globe, 27 Cong., 3 Sess., 154, 198-200, 227; 28
Cong., 1 Sess., Appendix, 224, 622; 29 Cong., 1 Se!lS., 1214-17; 29 Cong., 2
Sess., 356, 367, Appendix, 127-28, 132; 30 Cong., 1 Sess., Appendix, 337-40,
350, 370, 383-93.
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mental system. The interest in this issue was, therefore, great and
general, the rivalry over routes and termini was intense. 20 Professor
F. H. Hodder has shown what can be done toward illuminating one
famous episode in our history, the Kansas-Nebraska Bill, by sketching
in this Pacific railway background. 21 The real dignity and importance
of our ante-bellum isthmian diplomacy would be better understood
if we should more often discuss it along with the Pacific railway issue22
rather than as a detached episode in our history. 23
Then there is the matter of sectionalism. Of course, we must cease
writing our history as if sectionalism of the North and South were the
only important fact in the ante-helium period and every other matter
turned or waited upon it. We have allowed sectionalism to obscure
somewhat the story of the onward march of democracy, industry,
culture, and even nationalism. Yet when all is said by way of correcting
emphasis, sectionalism was one of the greatest facts in our history and
had most tragic consequences.
We cannot ignore it or exorcise it away. We must understand and
explain it. All factors bearing upon it should be analyzed. The effect
of improved means of transportation and communication upon sec
tionalism has by no means been neglected, 24 but it still awaits satisfying
analysis and summarization.
Orators and political philosophers before the Civil War fondly pic
tured railroads, steamboat and telegraph lines as bonds which were
operating to bind the Union together, remove prejudices and mis
understandings, spread common ideas, and establish a community of
interest. But sectionalism was not allayed, the war came. What was the
matter? Were the railroads, steamboats, and telegraph lines enough? Or
were there too many? There were more in 1861 than ever before.
20 These ideas are somewhat amplified in R. R. Russel, "The Pacific Rail
way Issue in Politics prior to the Civil War," Miss. Val. Hist. Rev., XII, 187.
21

F. H. Hodder, "The Railroad Background of the Kansas-Nebraska Act,"

ibid., 3-22.

22 John B. McMaster, History of the People of the United States (New
York, 1909-1918). However, this account is incomplete.
23 Separate discussion has too often led authors to emphasize jingoistic as
sertions of the Monroe Doctrine or a restless search after more land for cotton
and negroes as the prime motives of our isthmian diplomacy. See, for example,
M. W. Williams, Anglo-American Isthmian Diplomacy, 1815-1915 (Washing
ton, 1916).
24 For examples see Chaning, op. cit., VI, chap. xiii; C. R. Fish, "The
Decision of the Ohio Valley," American Historical Association, Report, 1910,
pp. 15 3 -64; Phillips, op. cit., 3 86-96; and T. D. Jervey, The Railroad the Con
queror (Columbia, 1913) and Robert Y. Hayne and His Times (New York,
1909).
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The net effect of improved means of communication down to 1861
seems to have been actually to augment sectionalism rather than to
allay it. Improved means of communication made the North and South
somewhat better acquainted, but this better acquaintance did not re
move prejudices in the North against slavery nor in the South against
abolitionists; rather it seems to have increased them. Better facilities of
travel encouraged the northern people to become excessively addicted to
the convention habit, the southern people at least moderately so. Inter
sectional conventions, however, were comparatively few. Northern
conventions nursed generous enthusiasms for various reforms, striking
the shackles from the slave for one; southern conventions nursed a
feeling of southern wrongs. Nor, before 1861, did better means of
transportation even tend to bring a community of interest between the
sections. Such facilities enabled the southern people, more readily than
before, to get their manufactured goods and a portion of their foodstuffs
from the East, or from the Northwest, or from Europe by way of the
East, while they devoted themselves more exclusively than ever to grow
ing their great staples for export to the North or to Europe, chiefly in
northern ships. Northern people regarded this intersectional exchange
of goods and products as mutually advantageous. A large proportion
of the southern people came, especially when cotton prices were low, to
look upon their commercial and industrial dependence on the North
as "degrading vassalage," and economically disadvantageous. 2 5 Futher
more, northern commercial and industrial interests and southern agri
cultural interests demanded different policies on the part of the federal
government, and bitter quarrels ensued.
Steamboats, canals, and railroads also contributed to the develop
ment of northern sectionalism in another way, by assimilating the Old
Northwest to the economy and culture of the East. Thus they made
possible a political alliance between the two as against the South. The
fact has been frequently cited that they developed a considerable trade
between the Northwest and the East and between the Northwest and
Europe through the East. In fact, this trade soon came to exceed greatly
the trade between the Northwest and the South. The East looked upon
this trade as mutually advantageous and came eventually to lend sup
port to western measures designed to increase it, while for various rea
sons, there was not the same disposition in the Northwest as in the
South to regard commercial and industrial dependence on the East as
degrading vassalage. For one thing, the Northwest never became so
exclusively devoted to staple agriculture. However, there was an econ25 Russel, op. cit.
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om1c basis for political alliance between East and Northwest much
more important than a mere large volume of trade. Canals, steamboats,
and railroads, together with great natural resources and the energy and
thrift of the people, brought prosperity to the Old Northwest. They
brought towns, cities, merchants, packing-houses, carshops, ship-yards,
prospects of iron and coal mines, eastern capital, and the prospect of
more employers and wage earners, in short, an economic order which,
by 1860, began to resemble that of the East. In one respect the two
sections had never been widely different; in both, small farms and free
labor everywhere prevailed. In this similarity of systems lay chiefly the
economic basis for political alliance. But the basis for political co
operation between East and Northwest was not solely or even primarily
economic. It was cultural. The majority of the early emigrants to the
Old Northwest were of southern stock, but when railroads, steamboats,
and canals came they gave the section a population preponderantly
eastern in origin and, therefore, preponderantly eastern in ideals, beliefs,
and prejudices. 26 The new facilities for travel and communication were
an influence making for continued and greater homogeneity through
out the North in these respects.
Likewise, better means of transportation and communication helped
to develop southern sectionalism by assimilating more and more of the
South to a umform type of economy and culture. They did not develop
a great internal commerce within the South. 2 7 Most of the trade con
tinued to be with the North and Europe. Rather, improved connections
with the outside world made it possible for similar physiographic and
climatic conditions to support in the larger area the same sort of
economic and social system, namely, plantations, slavery, and staple
crops produced for export. Culturally the newer parts of the South
were the offspring of the older and there had been little time to stray
from the paternal pattern. The new means of communication and
travel brought greater uniformity in this respect. Thus was the way
prepared for the acceptance of the tenets of the South Carolina school
(so vigorously propagated) by a sufficient number to precipitate the
cotton states into revolution when an exclusively northern combination
threatened to gain control of the national government.
It would seem, therefore, that in the period before secession, im
proved means of communication, as far as they had developed, had
26 This statement is well supported in the case of Illinois in A. C. Cole,

The Era of the Civil War, 1848-1870 (Springfield, 1919), chap. i; also F.
Turner, The Frontier in American History (New York, 1920), 135-42.
27

Phillips, op. cit., 386-96 .
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actually tended to augment sectionalism. There can be no doubt, how
ever, that in the long run they have been nationalizing factors. If armed
confiict could have been avoided by compromises for another decade or
so, it would have become impossible, and the railroads would have
played a large part in determining the issue.
Already, by 1860, railroads were beginning to draw sections of the
border slave states into the current of national life; the influence of
railroads, built or prospective, upon the decision of the border states
in 1861 has often been remarked. Railroads would soon have become
numerous enough to give the South some internal trade, thus giving an
impetus to the growth of towns and cities. They would have taken
more northern men South, and many more southern men North. They
would have brought in their wake repair-shops, carshops, and loco
motive works. They might have given an impetus to the lumber
industry. They would have penetrated iron and coal fields and
aroused southern people to the prospect of their development. They
would have put southern water-power sites on transportation lines, thus
giving another incentive to manufactures. They would have put isolated
rural communities in touch with the currents of commerce and thus
would have began the transformation of backwoodsmen into moder
ately prosperous farmers. In these several ways they would have con
tributed to the formation of a class of capitalists who were not planta
tion owners, uf free laborers with class consciousness, and of independ
ent farmers not directly and primarily interested in slavery. The grip
of the planting class on southern politics would have been weakened,
possibly broken, and the influence of classes less antagonistic to national
policies would have been correspondingly increased. With such changes
slavery itself would have become difficult to police,28 and, therefore,
less earnestly defended. Within a decade several more north and south
roads would have crossed the intersectional boundary line, and with
both northern and southern stockholders and personnel, would have
strengthened the bonds of union, in one respect at least. When secession
came, Texas was on the point of becoming the scene of railway strug
gles and land speculation and settlement, the like of which the South
had not yet seen. Within ten years or less a railroad would have extend
ed across her plains from New Orleans, another from Vicksburg, one
from Memphis by way of Little Rock, another from Cairo with Chica
go connections, and still another from St. Louis through Springfield
and Fort Smith. Texas cattle would have been going to St. Louis and

28 Russel, op. cit., chap. viii.
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Chicago markets. Ten years without armed conflict would have been
sufficient for the construction of a Southern Pacific railroad. Texas
interests might have become too varied to be conducive to revolution.
Likewise, another decade or two of uninterrupted railroad building
would have mfluenced powerfully northern sectionalism. Railroads
would have helped to colonize the territories with a free labor popula
tion; and this done, the North might have become more willing to let
the South solve her labor and racial problems without interference.
Nor is it certain that the new West thus created would have had such
a community of interest with the East as to permit its joining a north
ern political combination against the South.
Considering these signs of the times and others which it is not within
the province of this paper to discuss, it would appear that, whether it
was so understood at the time or not, in 1861 secession was a matter of
then or never for the old order in the cotton states. It is extremely
improbable that in the sweep of social forces the peculiar combination
and play of factors and conditions so conducive to secession sentiment
would have persisted long. It was the task of national statesmanship to
interpret the trend of the times and to make the compromises, conces
sions, and adjustments necessary to prevent conflicting interests and
ambitions from resulting in an attempted dissolution of the Union. 29
Statesmanship failed. Secession and civil war came. But we are not
entitled to lay the flattering unction to our souls that the Civil War
was an inevitable conflict.

29 Dodd, wntmg of the state of the Union at the opening of Franklin
Pierce's administration said: "A new era had begun . . . . and all the social
tendencies seemed to be working out a national life which was no longer paro
chial. It was the business of politics so to guide and regulate the varying activi
ties of the people that sectional hatreds should pass away and that the resources
of the country should not be squandered," op. cit., 206.
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The Pacific Railway Issue in Politics
Prior to the Civil War
By

0

ROBERT R. RUSSEL

Reprinted from The Mississippi Valley Historical Review,
XII (September 1925), 187-201.

NE OF THE great national issues or problems of the period from
about 1840 to 1860 which have not received their just deserts
from historians, was that of communication and transportation between
the settled portions of the United States east of the Rockies and the
possessions on the Pacific. It is the object of this article to deal with
some aspects of this question, particularly with the extent of public
interest in it, why so much interest was manifested, and why such great
public interest did not earlier result in the establishment of a Pacific
railroad or other satisfactory means of communication.
The question of communication with the Pacific was one of con
siderable interest from the time of our first claim to Oregon, but it
began to arouse something like general interest in the later 1830's and
early 1840's. Such an interest may be accounted for by the growth of
our whaling industry in the northern Pacific, the extension of the fur
trade to the Oregon country, the discovery of new routes, the diplomatic
contest with Great Britain over the ownership of Oregon, and a growing
interest in the possibilities of trade with China and other Asiatic coun
tries, evoked by the actual increase in that trade and by British efforts
to open Chinese ports to the commerce of the world.
As early as 1835 the United States Senate requested President Jack
son to consider opening negotiations relative to a canal across New
Granada or Central America. I Senator Benton, of Missouri, early took
an interest in establishing means of overland transportation. From time
to time after about 1836 ( when very few railroads existed anywhere in
the United States) various individuals suggested building a railroad to
1 James D. Richardson, A Compilation of the Messages and Papers of the
Presidents . .. (Washington, 1895-99), IV, 512.
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Oregon 2 but it was Asa Whitney, New York merchant, who popu
larized the idea. In 1845 he proposed to build a railroad along a vague
ly defined route from Lake Michigan to Puget Sound if the government
would sell him for ten cents an acre a strip of land sixty miles wide
the length of the road. According to Whitney and other advocates of
the plan the road would bind Oregon to us, settle our western lands,
thus solving our immigration problem, and, finally and most important,
become the great artery of a magnificent trade between Asia and the
United States and between Asia and Europe across our territory. It was
to be the ultimate solution of the problem that had excited the imagin
ation of Columbus and so many others, to find a short route to the
Indies.3 Whitney memorialized Congress and gained many friends for
his plan there. During several years he toured the country addressing
mass meetings, railroad conventions, chambers of commerce, and state
legislatures, and inducing them to pass resolutions indorsing his project.
He wrote voluminously. A majority of the newspaper press of the
country at one time or another lent him support. His plan was kept
prominently before the country for about seven years before it was
definitely rejected.
But Whitney's bold scheme soon raised up numerous advocates of
other routes and plans. For example, Senator Benton championed a
national road, built by the government, from St. Louis as the eastern
terminus. As long as Oregon was the only territory on the Pacific to
which we had a claim, the Whitney road found considerable support
even as far south as the Gulf states; but even then several Southerners
suggested a southern route for a Pacific railway terminating in Mexican
territory.4 No direct evidence has been found to prove that they advo
cated war upon Mexico to secure such a route. There is plenty of
evidence, however, to show that the government sought to acquire
California from Mexico because, among other reasons, the fine harbor
of San Francisco might become the "depot of the vast commerce which
must exist on the Pacific."5 And once the Mexican War was begun

2

These early suggestions are discussed in some detail in E. V. Smalley,

3

See especially Whitney's third memorial to Congress in 3 0 Cong., 1Sess.,

History of the Northern Pacific Railroad (New York, 1883); J. P. Davis, The
Union Pacific Railway . ... (Chicago, 1894); and H. H.Bancroft, History of
California (San Francisco, 1884 -90), VII, chap. xix.
House Report No. 7 3 3.

4 DeBow's Review, I, 2
2-23; III, 328-3 9, 4 75-83.Cf.Edward Mayes, "Or
igin of the Pacific Railroads, and Especially of the Southern Pacific," in Publi
cations of the Mississippi Historical Society, VI, 313 1
- 4.
s E. g., J. K. Polk, Diary ... (Chicago, 1910), I, 71-72; M. W. Willi-
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there were numerous suggestions that the government seize the terri
tory over which ran specified, prospective railroad routes. 6 During the
negotiations for peace a large sum was offered Mexico for the right of
way across the Isthmus of Tehuantepec but was refused. 7 The treaty
of Guadalupe Hidalgo contained an article relative to a railroad which
might be built along the Gila River, designated as a part of the
boundary.
The acquisition of the Mexican cession, the discovery of gold in
California, the great migration thither, and the phenomenal develop
ment of that region gave the establishment of means of communication
with the Pacific an importance and interest it had not possessed before.
The government must be able to dispatch troops to the new possessions
to defend them against foreign enemies, along the emigrant trails to
protect the emigrants against the Indians, or to the Mexican border to
prevent Indian depredations across the frontier ( as required by treaty).
Means were required to transport troops for these several purposes
speedily and cheaply and along with them the necessary military stores.
The mails must be carried to and from the new possessions. Better
means of transportation were needed for the convenience and safety
of the thousands of emigrants. It was represented that, unless there
could be a constant and speedy interchange of intelligence and goods
between the people on the east side of the Rockies and those on the
other, estrangement would arise and eventually political separation
might occur.8 Transcontinental railroads and other means of communi
cation and transportation would promote the settlement of the interven
ing territory along the routes and the development of the resources of
the vast interior. A railroad near Canada might help to draw her into
our system;9 one along the Mexican frontier might hasten the absorp
tion of the northern tier of Mexican states. 10 The control of transit
routes across the Isthmus might in the fullness of time bring the regions
traversed under the Stars and Stripes. ! 1 To the rapidly growing populaams, Anglo-American Isthmian Diplomacy, 1815-1915 (Washington, 1916), 53;
Richardson, op. cit., IV, 536-47, 635; DeBow's Review, I, 64-66.
6 DeBow's Review, III, 147-48, 475-83, 495; American Railroad Journal,
XIX, 761-62.
7 Richardson, op. cit., V, 16-17.
8 The best statements of the above mentioned considerations are to be
found in [Annual] Report of the Secretary of War (Jefferson Davis), Dec. 3,
18 55, and in his letter to Rep. J. M. Sandidge, Jan. 29, 1856, in Dunbar Row
land (ed.), ]efferson Davis, Constitutionalist, II, 588-90.
9 Cong. Globe, 35 Cong., 1 Sess., App., 430 .
10 Idem, 33 Cong., 1 Sess., 8 82; DeBow's Review, XXI, 469-90, passim.
11 Richardson, op. cit., V, 447-48.
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tion of the Pacific Coast, satisfactory means of communication with
and transportation to the rest of the Union was a matter of urgent
importance and almost of necessity. The establishment of such facilities
there became the public policy of paramount interest and the highest
object of statesmanship.
Weighty as were the political and military considerations which
counselled the construction of a railroad or canal connecting with the
Pacific, it must be said that the great interest in the subject shown by
the people of the Mississippi Valley and farther east grew chiefly out
of the expectation that, with the provision of proper transportation
facilities, a great tide of trade and travel would set in, not only with
the Pacific Coast and the settlements which would accompany the
road but also between Europe and Asia by way of the United States.
The people of every city or town of any pretensions whatever near
our Mississippi Valley frontier or on the Gulf believed that, if they
could make their city the terminus of a railroad, or of the railroad, to
the Pacific, or of an isthmian route, so that it might exact tribute from
the enormous trade to develop, it would become a great metropolis.
Said a citizen of New Orleans: "... we shall have all the commerce
and travel of the Northern Atlantic States, and all the commerce and
travel of Europe that is destined for the Pacific Ocean, for India and
China, passing through our city; portions of their products will be left
for sale here, or exchanged for our own, or those of the great West, and
the thousand products of our artistical and manufacturing skill. Is not
every State in the West and South interested in securing such a mart as
New Orleans will then be for their productions? It will then be the
market of the world ..."12 Even people of cities on the Atlantic Coast
entertained glowing expectations of the nourishing qualities of that
stream of trade and travel even after it should have been divided and
subdivided.13
By about 1850 the main outlines of the railroad system of the United
States were rapidly taking form either in the shape of roads actually
built or building or in well-defined projects for which charters had been
or were about to be secured. Cities and states were contending in

12 American Railroad Journal, XXV, 502.
13 For example, "The subject of connecting the cities of Savannah, Mo
bile, and New Orleans by a railroad, has already been much agitated in the
South. This will, undoubtedly, be soon undertaken; and, together with the
New Orleans and Opelousas road, now under contract, would form the eastern
half of the great connection between the Atlantic and Pacific. If the El Paso
route is the one adopted by the government, Savannah would become the
great Atlantic Depot, and San Diego the Pacific." DeBow's Review, XV, 641.
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"mighty rivalry" with each other for these arteries of commerce which
would assure their future greatness. Every railroad company with a
project pointing westwardly anywhere near a possible starting point
for a Pacific railroad or a possible direct continuation of one to the
Atlantic, the Gulf, or the Lakes, was determined to make its road a
link in, or at least a branch of, a great chain of railroads stretching to
the Pacific.The possibility that a road might occupy such a favorable
position was used to win the favor of investors and the public.It would
seem that the locations of several roads projected in the Mississippi
Valley during this period were determined very largely by the possibility
of making them links in, or continuations of, a Pacific railway. Said
the agent of the New Orleans, Opelousas, and Great Western: "The
hundreds of millions of gold produced by California; the rapid devel
opment of our possessions in Oregon; the great increase in the whale
trade in the north Pacific; an increased trade with Mexico and South
America; the absolute certainty of finally crushing the Chinese walls
and overthrowing Japanese nonintercourse; and the opening of com
mercial relations with 700,000,000 people who inhabit Asia, and the
millions of the islands of the Pacific; ... will furnish to this road and
its St. Louis branch a transportation and business unknown to the
annals of railroad prosperity on this globe." 4
1
The question of communication with the Pacific had its sectional
aspects also. About this time the people of the South were becoming
keenly aware of what they pleased to call "Southern decline. " Their
section was not keeping pace with the North in various lines of economic
progress. There was much analyzing of causes and searching for
remedies. Commercial conventions were held to consult over the
matter.15 A railroad to the Pacific by a southern route was among the
most prominent measures considered for the regeneration of the section.
Said the New Orleans Delta, commenting on the deep interest shown
in a Pacific railway by the Southern Commercial Convention meeting
in Memphis, 1853: "This was the Aaron's rod that swallowed up all
others. This was the great panacea, which is to release the South from
its bondage to the North, which is to pour untold wealth into our lap;
which is to build up cities, steamships, manufactories, educate our
children, and draw into our control what Mr. Bell calls 'the untold
wealth of the gorgeous East.' 1
" 6
14 American Railroad Journal, XXV, 57.
1
15 See R. R. Russel, Economic Aspects of Southern Sectionalism, I 840-1861,
(University of Illinois Studies in the Social Sciences, Vol. XI, Nos. 1-2, Urbana,
1923), especially chap. v.
16 Quoted in Richmond Enquirer, June 24, 1853.
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In the North there was not the same disposition to look upon a
Pacific railroad as an instrument for sectional economic aggrandize
ment. There was a sectional aspect of the question, however, which the
leaders of neither section overlooked. If, for example, the first rail
road to the Pacific, and probably the only one for a generation, should
follow a southern route, California and the intervening territory would
be settled most largely by Southern people, would in all probability be
slaveholding, would be economically allied to the South, and thus the
South would gain an advantage in the sectional struggles of the time.
If, however, the first railroad should follow a northern or central route,
the North would, in a similar manner, gain the political advantage. If
an isthmian route or a railroad route near the Mexican border were
adopted, it might result in the annexation of territory, which would be
allied to the South in interests. In 1849 a distinguished Southerner
wrote: " ... I can tell you that the accursed question of slavery is
already mixing itself up with the road, and the free States, who are
removed from it, will not go for it if it is to go through slave territory." 17
The Southern Commercial Convention of January, 1855, resolved,
"That the construction of a railroad to the Pacific Ocean, from proper
points on the Mississippi river, within the slave-holding States of the
Union, is not only important to those States, but indispensable to their
welfare and prosperity, and even to their continued existence as equal
and independent members of the confederacy."18
After about 1846 no one suggested improved wagon and stage roads
to the Pacific as more than a temporary, makeshift solution of the
problem; although many believed such roads would have to precede
and blaze the trails for railroads.Telegraph lines would be valuable
but would solve the problem only in part, and that a minor one. A
canal across one of the isthmian routes was considered desirable by
many, but its construction would be a long and costly undertaking.
Railroads across the Isthmus, connecting with steamship lines in both
oceans, could be provided quickly and at comparatively small cost. But
isthmian projects in general would require the consent of foreign govern
ments to their construction. In case of war with a stronger naval
power, they might be closed to our commerce, mails, troops, and
military supplies, and our Pacific coast rendered defenseless. Because of

17 DeBow's Review, VII, 37.
18 J dem, XVIII, 520. Cf. speech of J. A. McDougal of Cal., Aug. 24, 1852,
in Western Journal and Civilian, IX, 97; and article by W. W. Burwell on
"The True Policy of the South," in DeBow's Review, XXI, 469-90.
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the greater distances to be traversed, they, especially railroads, were not
expected to bring to our ports the great Asia trade. And, more, they
could be of no direct commercial benefit to the vast interior of the
country.19 Such projects, therefore, found their chief support in the
Gulf ports like New Orleans and Mobile, whose interests would be
best served by a canal or railroad across the Isthmus of Tehuantepec,
and from the private companies which gained control of transportation
across Panama and Nicaragua, namely, the Pacific Mail Company,
the Atlantic and Pacific Ship Canal Company, and their subsidiaries.
The country at large regarded means of transit across the Isthmus
with no great favor except as a temporary convenience until trans
continental railroads could be constructed.
For providing the latter, plans and projects multiplied amazingly
in the years immediately following the War with Mexico. Almost all
of them agreed in demanding aid of the federal government; for no
private corporation in that day would, or could, undertake such a
gigantic task unaided. But the plans differed widely as to the kind and
extent of the aid they demanded. They differed more widely still as
to route and terminus. By about 1850 it was apparent from reports of
explorers, travelers, and military reconnaissances that each of about
five routes through the Rockies might prove practicable, namely, the
extreme northern route between the 47th and the 49th parallels of
latitude, the 42nd degree routes by way of South Pass and Great Salt
Lake, Benton's or the central route by a pass at the head of the Arkansas
River between the 38th and 39th parallels, the 35th degree route by
way of the Canadian Valley and Albuquerque, and the extreme south
ern or 32nd degree route via EI Paso and the Gila Valley. Each one had
its staunch advocates, before as well as after the government surveys
were made. On the Pacific end two of these routes ( the 42nd degree
route and Benton's route) naturally terminated at San Francisco and
the others could be made to do so; and after that city had had a year
or two of its phenomenal growth, it was generally agreed that San
Francisco must be one of the western termini if not the only Western
terminus. Memphis, St. Louis, and some point on the Mississippi or
Missouri in line with Chicago were most frequently advocated for the
eastern terminus, but there were at least a dozen other towns and cities
which had their champions, ranging from Galveston, on the Gulf, to
Superior, Wisconsin, at the head of lake navigation.

19 Cong. Globe, 33 Cong., 2 Sess., 225; App., 74; 35 Cong., 2 Sess., 45859; American Railroad Journal, XXII, 723; Hunt's Merchant's Magazine,
XXII, 153-54; Rowland, op. cit., III, 364-65, 397, 418.
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It was difficult to unite the people and interests of any state near
the frontier in support of any single route, terminus, or plan of financ
ing the road. The people of states farther removed were less divided
as to route and terminus. Sectional agreement in support of a single
project was out of the question. A partial analysis of the alignment on
the issue of terminus and route will be sufficient to substantiate these
statements.
In Missouri in 1849, a railroad, rather suggestively called the
Pacific, was chartered and soon begun, to run from St. Louis to the
western border of the state at the mouth of the Kansas River. A south
west branch was shortly provided for to run via Springfield to the
southwest corner of the state. Another railroad, the Hannibal and St.
Joseph, was to cross the northern part of the state from east to west. A
north and south road was to connect the Hannibal and St. Joseph with
St. Louis. People of St. Louis generally demanded that the Pacific
railway be built from the mouth of the Kansas by the central route, but
if that could not be secured they were prepared to go for a continuation
of the southwest branch of their Missouri Pacific by the 35th degree, or
Albuquerque, route. But people along the line of the southwest branch,
including Congressman Phelps of the Springfield District, would sup
port no route except that of the 35th degree. 2 0 People living near or
interested in the Hannibal and St. Joseph Railroad believed that St.
Joseph should be the eastern terminus of the Pacific railway, as did, to
a diminishing degree, people interested in any one of a prospective
chain of roads continuing the Hannibal and St. Joseph eastward via
Quincy and Springfield, Illinois. People financially interested in or
living near any of the chain of roads leading from St. Louis to Cin
cinnati and thence to Baltimore or Pittsburgh were favorable to St.
Louis for a terminus and a central route. A chain of railroads connect
ing Terre Haute, Indianapolis, Columbus, Pittsburgh, and Philadelphia
could connect about equally well with the Hannibal and St. Joseph
or the Missouri Pacific, and, consequently, Pennsylvania, and central
Ohio and Indiana were for either a St. Louis or a St. Joseph terminus
with little choice between them.
Iowa by about 1853 had developed projects for three main east
and west roads across the state, the Dubuque and Pacific, the Mississip
pi and Missouri, to run from Davenport to Council Bluffs, and the
Burlington and Missouri River. Each road was urged as a link in the
road to the Pacific, and each connected with various roads or chains

20

Cong. Globe, 35 Cong., 1 Sess., App., 424; 36 Cong., 1 Sess., 2 331, 2408-

11, 2439-40.
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of roads to the east across Illinois or beyond. The people of Chicago
and that city's eastern connections wanted the Pacific railroad to con
nect with one of Chicago's several western railroad radii, preferably the
Chicago and Rock Island, which was continued by the Davenport and
Council Bluffs and pointed toward South Pass and San Francisco.
The people of New York could, and did, profit by either the Panama
or Nicaragua transportation route. Of transcontinental routes, they
preferred a northern one connecting with the Great Lakes, but they
did not oppose a central route from St. Louis or St. Joseph. Senator
Seward more than once made the proud boast that, no matter what
route might be chosen, its eastern terminus would be New York City.21
Michigan and New England could gain no special benefit from a road
terminating south of Chicago, and, therefore, preferred the extreme
northern route.
The settlers and speculators of Superior, Wisconsin, and vicinity
were convinced that no Pacific railway which did not connect with that
magnificent inland waterway system, the Great Lakes, at its western
most point could be expected to attract any of the China trade. The
population of far away Oregon Territory or, a little later, the State
of Oregon and Washington Territory inclined strongly to the same view.
Arkansas citizens were divided three ways as to where they wanted
the Pacific railroad to cross their state. They could not agree even in
their choice between the 35th degree and the 32nd degree route. 22
Tennessee people were united in support of a Memphis terminus and
had little choice between the two southern routes. Because of the Vir
ginia and Tennessee and the Memphis and Charleston railroad pro
jects, most of the people of Virginia east of the Alleghenies, of South
Carolina, and of northern Georgia and Alabama who wanted a Pacific
railroad at all, supported the pretensions of :tvlemphis. However, inter
ested persons in Savannah, the central parts of Georgia, Alabama, and
Mississippi, and northern Louisiana inclined to favor a connection
by way of Vicksburg, Shreveport, El Paso, and the valley of the Gila.
The hopes of the city builders of New Orleans centered chiefly in a
project for a railroad across the Isthmus of Tehuantepec, but when that
project encountered unexpected difficulties and the New Orleans,
Opelousas, and Western Railroad made a promising start, they bent

21 J dem, 33 Cong., 2 Sess., 750; 35 Cong., 1 Sess., 1584.
22 Some of them wanted a route from Memphis
Smith; others, one from Memphis via Little Rock to
corner of the �tate; still others wanted it to run from
Rock to Fulton. Fort Smith was on the 35th degree
proposed connection with the 32nd degree route.
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via Little Rock to Fort
Fulton in the southwest
Cairo, Illinois, via Little
route; Fulton was on a

their efforts toward making the latter the first link in a road to the
Pacific.
Numerous railroad conventions were held for the purpose of
crystalizing or creating public sentiment in favor of particular plans
or locations. The most notable of these were the St. Louis and Memphis
Pacific railroad conventions of October, 1849, and the Philadelphia con
vention of April, 1850. 23 At least three of the sessions of the Southern
Commercial Convention devoted more time to the subject than to any
other. 24 Several Pacific railroad companies were formed, and waited in
a receptive mood for federal aid. Western governors frequently dis
cussed the subject in their messages, and legislatures resolved and peti
tioned in regard to it. Both the Democratic and Republican parties
declared in favor of a Pacific railroad in their platforms of 1856, the
Republicans going so far as to say that it should be built by the "most
central and practicable route." In 1860 the Republicans and both
wings of the Democrats declared for the immediate construction of the
railroad. But because federal aid was demanded by almost all of them,
the struggle among the various rival interests and projects had to be
fought out very largely in Congress, and, in spite of the fact that the
nation as a whole after about 1849 approved the extension of consider
able aid to one or more transcontinental railroads, it was impossible
until 1862 and 1864 to get legislation that would insure the building
of a road.
The difficulties were enormous. Pacific railway legislation had to
contend for the time of Congress with the exciting sectional quarrels
over slavery. The isthmian projects could command no governmental
financial aid beyond liberal contracts for carrying the mails, yet they
used their influence to defeat legislation which might bring rivals into
the field. Democrats from the old South, especially, had constitutional
scruples against federal aid to internal improvements and a disinclina
tion to increase government expenditures which could not be overcome.
Whigs and Democrats were inclined to divide along party lines over such
questions as whether or not the federal government could charter a
railroad company; if so, whether it could authorize it to operate in the
states or only in the territories, and whether money appropriations in
aid of a Pacific railroad must be confined to sections in the territories

23 Proceedings in American Railroad Journal, XXII, 663-64, 690-93, 70811, 7 2 1- 23; XXIII, 2 28-31; Western Journal and Civilian, III, 71-75 (St.
Louis).
24

Memphis, 1853, Charleston, 1854, and New Orleans, 1855. See Russel,

op. cit., chap. v.
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or might also be extended to sections within the states. Yet neither party
was able to unite upon a Pacific railroad bill and force it through as a
party measure.
The Pacific railway question also became involved with other issues
over which much division had arisen. Advocates of land grants in aid
of railways on the alternate sections principles insisted upon applying
that principle to Pacific railway bills. Many congressmen who favored
giving away the lands to actual settlers for homesteads objected to
grants to railways. Many congressmen from landless states objected to
large grants to Pacific railroads because they wanted the lands divided
among the several states. Tariff men insisted that only American iron
be used in the construction of railroads to the Pacific.
But the greatest obstacle in the way of Pacific railway legislation
lay in the inability to agree upon a route or routes. If a bill were
framed for a central route the advocates of northern and southern
routes would unite with the small, compact minority altogether oppos
ed to government aid and defeat it. If the bill provided for two roads,
or for three roads, or for one main trunk with several branches to take
care of the chief contenders for the terminus, the votes gained by such
log-rolling process were always offset by votes lost on the ground that
the project was too costly for the country to bear. On more than one
occasion the old guard which opposed government aid in any form or
amount united with the friends of some particular plan or route to
amend a bill in such a way as to make it unsatisfactory to other friends
of a Pacific railway, and then united with the latter to defeat the bill
upon its final passage. Even bills to establish overland mail service by
stage were bitterly fought over because it was believed that the choice
of the stage routes might have an influence on the selection of the route
of a Pacific railway. 2 5 Representatives from the Pacific Coast were
about the only ones who would support almost any bill to further the

25 Cong. Globe, 35 Cong., 1 Sess., App., 2 5-28; 35 Cong., 2 Sess., 239,
261-63, 305; 36 Cong., 1 Sess., 1061, 1131-33, 1647-49, 2338-39, 2 457-60. Prof.
F. H. Hodder has shown that the organization of Kansas and Nebraska as ter
ritories, 1854, was in large part an incident in the struggle over the terminus
and route of a Pacific railway. "The Genesis of the Kansas-Nebraska Bill," in
Proceedings of the State Historical Society of Wisconsin, 1912. Prof. Hodder
further developed this thesis in his presidential address before the meeting of
the Mississippi Valley Historical Association, Detroit, May 1, 1925, (printed in
Mississippi Valley Hist. Rev., XII, 3-2 2 ). Dr. James C. Malin has described
how our Indian policy in the West in the period before the Civil War was
greatly influenced by the sectional and local struggle over the route of a Pacific
railway. Indian Policy and Westward Expansion (Bulletin of the University of
Kansas, Humanistic Studies, Vol. II, No. 3, Lawrence, 19 2 1}, especially pp. 4452.
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establishment of means of communication with the Pacific, and even
they did not always cooperate effectively among themselves. 26
The limits of this article will not permit even a summary account
of the chapters or episodes in the struggle of the several contending
interests over the terminus and route of a Pacific communication, with
their varying hopes and fortunes. New factors constantly entering or
being interjected into the struggle modified its charter somewhat, but
none altered it essentially until the secession of eleven Southern states
in 1860 and 1861 left the location of the route to the North alone.
An adequate account of the struggle would require a retelling of
the story of American isthmian and Mexican diplomacy prior to the
Civil War with particular reference to, and greater, but not undue,
emphasis upon, the attempt to get transit rights and privileges and the
right to protect the same, and somewhat less emphasis upon attempted
extension of slave territory. 2 7 It would include also the story of the
politico-economic activities and intrigues of the several American com
panies which secured or tried to secure the privilege of providing and
operating transportation facilities across the Isthmus. The account
would tell also how a bill giving aid in money and lands to a Pacific
railroad and leaving the route to be selected by the President, Pierce
being the president-elect, was about to pass the Senate in the second
session of the Thirty-Second Congress, but was defeated at the last
minute because Southern men found it was loaded against the choice
of a southern route. 28 Another chapter would show how Southern men
had the stage all set and the public mind largely prepared for govern
ment aid for a railroad by the route of the thirty-second degree early in
Pierce's administration but were frustrated in the House of Represen
tatives by the advocates of a central route. 2 9 Many Southerners then in
desperation lent encouragement to a plan fathered by Albert Pike, of
Arkansas, to have the road built by a combination of southern states,
cities, and railroad companies without the aid of the federal govern26 For example, Gwin and Broderick in the Senate. Cong. Globe, 35 Cong.,
Sess., 1 2 98, 1537, 1641-4 2 ; 35 Cong., 2 Sess., 357-59.

27 Williams, op. cit., and J. M. Callahan, "The Mexican Policy of Southern
Leaders under Buchanan's Administration" (in• American Historical Association,
Annual Report, 1910, pp. 135-51), are authoritative, but do not entirely cover
the subject.
28 The statement is based upon an unpublished study by the author of this
article. Davis, op. cit., 44-53 gives the same explanation, but does not try to
determine whether or not the bill was loaded. I believe it was.
29 Thomas H. Benton partially analyzed the southern plans in a speech in
the House of Representatives, Jan. 16, 1855, Cong. Globe, 33 Cong., 2 Sess.,
App., 73-82. See also ibid., 335.
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ment.30 The account would further relate how the Buchanan adminis
tration did its utmost to further the projects of the Southerners, par
ticularly by sending the great overland mail by the extreme southern
route, from St. Louis and Memphis, and by lending energetic aid in
behalf of the Tehuantepec speculators.3 l But it would also show how
Southern political and diplomatic finesse was more than offset by such
great factors as capital and commerce, growth of population, and
extension of settlements, working for the north or center. Most of the
California mail was northern in origin or destination. The same was
true of commerce. Settlements extended into Kansas, Nebraska, and
Minnesota, and sprang up along the central route with the discovery
of gold in the Pike's Peak region, and at Carson City, 1858, and the
Mormon colony in Utah increased in numbers. Most of the population
in California was in the northern part, and Oregon had sufficient poula
tion to be admitted to statehood in 1859. By 1860 the railroad system
was more fully developed north of the Ohio than south of it, and con
necting links for a Pacific railway were pushed farther to the west across
Missouri and Iowa than across Arkansas and Louisiana. Finally, while
the organization of the sectional Republican Party did not insure the
building of a railroad to the Pacific by a northern or a central route,
it rendered the building of one by a southern route well-nigh hopeless.

3o DeBow's Review, XVI, 636-37; XVII, 205-13, 408-10, 492-506, 593-99;
XVIII, 520-28, 632-35; XXI, 469-90; XXII, 81-105, passim.
See especially the report of Postmast, er General Aaron V. Brown in Cong.
35 Cong., 1 Sess., App., 25-28; speech of Sen. Wilson of Mass., Jan. 11,
1859, in idem, 2 Sess., 304-15; letter of Robert Toombs to W. W. Burwell, Nov.
30, 1857, in "The Correspondence of Robert Toombs, Alexander H. Stevens,
and Howell Cobb" (American Historical Association, Annual Report, 19Jl,
Pt. II).
31
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